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Beyond R v A: Sexual History Evidence and the Reform of S.41 
Jennifer Hey 
Abstract 
 
This thesis deals with the legal regulation of sexual history evidence in rape trials over the 
last four decades, primarily focusing on the legislative restrictions imposed throughout that 
time. It works chronologically from the formation of the Heilbron Committee and the 
subsequent change in law in 1976 under Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act. 
It goes on to judge both this piece of legislation as well as its successor; Section 41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 in terms of how successful they are in 
achieving their aims; namely to increase the conviction rate and encourage more women to 
report rape. The thesis aims to suggest a new way forward with regard to sexual history 
evidence and its use in the courts which has thus far encountered many problems and come 
up against many critics. It looks at scholars’ recent proposals for legislative and procedural 
change and discusses each on its own merits before using them as a springboard to suggest 
the best idea for reform. 
  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Beyond R v A: Sexual History Evidence and the Reform of S.41 
 
 
 
 
Jennifer Hey 
 
 
Master of Jurisprudence 
 
 
Durham Law School 
 
 
Durham University 
 
 
2011 
 
 
 
3 
 
Statement of Copyright 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Professor Clare McGlynn and Mr Neil Cobb for their continued support, 
guidance and constructive criticism throughout this process. 
Dedication 
 
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents, without whom none of this would have 
been possible. And not simply because they picked up the bill!  
 
 
4 
 
 
Contents 
Beyond R v A: Sexual History Evidence and the Reform of S.41 ............................................ 1 
Jennifer Hey ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................... 1 
Beyond R v A: Sexual History Evidence and the Reform of S.41 ............................................ 2 
Statement of Copyright ............................................................................................................ 3 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 3 
Dedication ................................................................................................................................ 3 
1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 8 
2. The Background and History of the Use of Sexual History Evidence in England and Wales
 ............................................................................................................................................... 12 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 12 
2.2 Common Law ............................................................................................................... 12 
2.3 Evidence of Previous Sexual Intercourse with the Defendant ...................................... 13 
2.4 Evidence of Prostitution or ‘Notorious for Want of Chastity’ ......................................... 13 
2.5 Evidence of Sexual History with Third Parties .............................................................. 15 
2.6 The Heilbron Report ..................................................................................................... 16 
2.6.1 The formation of the committee ............................................................................. 16 
2.6.2 Aims of the Committee .......................................................................................... 18 
2.6.3 The Recommendations made on Sexual History Evidence ................................... 18 
2.6.6 Problems with Heilbron .......................................................................................... 20 
2.7 Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 ........................................... 21 
2.8 Judicial Interpretation of Section 2 ............................................................................... 22 
2.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 26 
3. S.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 ............................................... 28 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 28 
3.2 The Aims of S.41 .......................................................................................................... 28 
3.3 The Home Office Report Speaking up for Justice 1999 ............................................ 29 
3.3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 29 
3.3.2 Options that the Working Group Considered ...................................................... 30 
3.4 The Legislative Process ............................................................................................... 31 
3.5 S.41 ........................................................................................................................... 35 
3.6 Analysis of the Gateways ............................................................................................. 36 
3.6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 36 
3.6.2 Not an Issue of Consent, S.41(3)(a) ...................................................................... 36 
3.6.3 Belief in Consent ................................................................................................... 36 
3.6.4 Denial, by the Defendant, of the Sexual Acts ........................................................ 38 
3.6.5 Motive to Lie .......................................................................................................... 39 
3.6.6 Consent is Not the Issue ....................................................................................... 41 
 
 
5 
 
3.6.7 ‘At or About the Same Time’ ............................................................................... 41 
3.6.8  So Similar it Cannot Reasonably be Explained as a Coincidence ..................... 43 
3.6.9 Rebuttal ............................................................................................................... 45 
3.7 Additional Hurdles ........................................................................................................ 46 
3.7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 47 
3.7.2 To Prevent an Unsafe Conviction .......................................................................... 47 
3.7.3 That the Main Purpose of the Evidence is not to Undermine the Victim’s 
Credibility ........................................................................................................................ 47 
3.7.4  The Evidence Must Relate to a Specific Instance or Specific Instances ............ 48 
3.8 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25 .................................................................................... 48 
3.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 52 
4. Assessing the successes of S.41 ...................................................................................... 55 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 55 
4.2 Scope of the Legislation ............................................................................................... 55 
4.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.2 Inclusion of the Prosecution ................................................................................... 56 
4.2.3 Is S.41 too Narrow? ............................................................................................. 56 
4.3 Lack of Clarity and Definition ........................................................................................ 57 
4.3.1 Specific Terms ....................................................................................................... 57 
4.3.2 The Focus of S.41 ................................................................................................. 57 
4.4 Procedural Criticisms ................................................................................................... 58 
4.4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 58 
4.4.2 Use of S.41 ............................................................................................................ 59 
4.4.3 The Difficulties facing Assessment ........................................................................ 59 
4.4.4 Are the Procedures being Adhered to? ................................................................. 59 
4.4.5 Procedural Avoidance ......................................................................................... 60 
4.4.6 Applications made at Trial ................................................................................... 62 
4.4.7 Moving Forward .................................................................................................. 62 
4.5 Inconsistency of application ......................................................................................... 63 
4.6 Kibble’s Study .............................................................................................................. 67 
4.7 Effect on conviction rates ............................................................................................. 72 
4.7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 72 
4.7.2 Can we rely on these figures as a marker for success? ........................................ 73 
4.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 74 
5. The future of S.41: Living with R v A .................................................................................. 76 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 76 
5.2 Does S.41 Need Additional Gateways? ....................................................................... 77 
5.2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 77 
5.2.2 A Gateway for Evidence of Sexual History with the Accused ............................. 79 
5.2.3 A Gateway for Evidence of Sexual History with Third Parties ............................. 80 
 
 
6 
 
5.3 Clarifying the Current Stance ..................................................................................... 82 
5.4 Enforcing the Current Rules ......................................................................................... 84 
5.5 Is Change Necessary? ................................................................................................. 87 
5.6 Are These Solutions Adequate? ................................................................................... 88 
5.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 89 
6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 90 
Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................. 92 
Section 2 Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976 ............................................................. 92 
2. Restrictions on evidence at trials for rape etc. ............................................................... 92 
Appendix 2 ............................................................................................................................. 93 
Section 41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 ................................................ 93 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 96 
A ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
B ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
C ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
D ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
E ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
F ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
G ........................................................................................................................................ 96 
H ......................................................................................................................................... 96 
I .......................................................................................................................................... 97 
J ......................................................................................................................................... 97 
K ......................................................................................................................................... 97 
L ......................................................................................................................................... 97 
M ........................................................................................................................................ 97 
N ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
O ........................................................................................................................................ 98 
P ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
Q ........................................................................................................................................ 98 
R ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
S ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
T ......................................................................................................................................... 98 
U ......................................................................................................................................... 99 
V ......................................................................................................................................... 99 
W ........................................................................................................................................ 99 
X ......................................................................................................................................... 99 
Y ......................................................................................................................................... 99 
Z ......................................................................................................................................... 99 
Case List .............................................................................................................................. 100 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
8 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1  Over ten years after the implementation of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999, which introduced significant restrictions on the use of sexual history evidence in 
rape trials, this thesis looks back on the treatment of such evidence in the last four decades 
and makes recommendations for legislative improvement in the future. Section 41 of the 
1999 Act was introduced to replace S.2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 and 
to restrict the use of sexual history evidence by removing judicial discretion and permitting 
such evidence only in very limited circumstances. Unfortunately, shortly after the 
implementation of s.41 the case of R v A (No. 2)1 came before the House of Lords and the 
decision in this case essentially restored a measure of judicial discretion thus throwing the 
legal situation into chaos.  
 
1.2 The two pieces of legislation to be assessed are Section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
Amendment Act 1976 and Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act. It is 
important to look at the legislative situation prior to S.41 in order to put the law in context and 
to make an informed assessment as to the best course of action for the future. As the 
subsequent chapters will show, the success of these pieces of legislation can be judged on a 
number of bases directly relating to their aims. In both circumstances the legislation was 
introduced to limit the use of sexual history evidence in rape trials and therefore success can 
firstly be measured on the amount of evidence which is still being allowed in. Other factors 
will include the number of women coming forward to report rape and seeing trials through to 
the end and the conviction or attrition rate. In assessing the successes and failures of both 
S.2 and S.41 this thesis hopes to suggest a more lasting solution for legislative and 
procedural reform. 
 
1.3 There are a number of reasons for limiting sexual history evidence in rape trials. The 
first being the low conviction rate for rape2 which continues to cause controversy. This can 
                                                1 [2001] UKHL 25 
2 There has been much debate surrounding the actual percentage of rape convictions in the UK and 
much controversy too. There is disagreement as to how the figure should be represented. For 
example, it can be said that, 58% of defendants of charges of rape which are brought before the 
courts are convicted. This figure looks a lot better than 6% but only takes into account those cases 
which result in a trial. I attended a conference last year at London South Bank University during which 
the Sapphire Unit of the Metropolitan Police spoke about how the 6% figure is misleading. Misleading 
though it may be, it is the number which is mostly commonly recognised both in the media and in 
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be linked to the fact that women are reluctant to report and see the complaint through to trial 
as they know that their sexual past may be brought into the court and used against them. As 
the Home Office found in their study in 1999, this is perceived, by women, as “unjust and an 
invasion of privacy.”3 The misuse of this evidence could exacerbate the already troubling 
culture of rape myths.4 Underlying these issues is also a more theoretical issue which is the 
question of whether or not sexual history evidence actually is relevant to consent. If it is not 
relevant then it is surely just being brought into the trial to prejudice the jury against the 
complainant. This approach will be discussed further in the thesis.  
 
1.4 The thesis will be divided up into four sections. The first section will look briefly at the 
common law and the situation which led to the creation of the Heilbron Report and the 
subsequent drafting of S.2 to limit sexual history evidence. It will discuss the ideas put 
forward in Heilbron as well as the limitations of the report. S.2 did not implement some of the 
valid suggestions given by the Committee, for instance their model of how third party 
evidential admission should be decided upon and therefore the chapter will go on to look at 
S.2 and assess its success in accordance with the provisions set out above to see if the 
legislation has fulfilled its aims. Having concluded that S.2 was not a success the next 
chapter goes on to look at the build up to the implementation of S.41 following the Speaking 
Up for Justice Report5 in 1999. In the same way that S.2 was assessed, the second chapter 
will discuss the success of S.41 by looking at each of the gateways through which sexual 
history evidence is allowed. The positives of this approach mean that later on in the thesis 
when new provisions are being suggested, each gateway has been assessed on its own 
merits so the entirety of S.41 will not automatically be discounted as a failure simply because 
the overall stance has not been entirely successful. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
research papers. See Whitestead, Tom, ‘Rape conviction rate figures ‘misleading’’, 15 March 2010, 
The Telegraph for further debate. 3 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence 
in rape trial’ (2006) London at p VII 4 Rape myths are incorrect perceptions held within society surround issues around rape, many of 
them about consent. For example that a woman dressed provocatively is somehow ‘asking for it’ and 
thus has less right to withhold consent to sex. For more on rape myths see Temkin, Jennifer,  Rape 
and the Legal Process (2nd Edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002), Lees, Sue, Carnal Knowledge 
Rape on Trial (2nd Edn The Women’s Press, London 2002) and Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987)  5 Speaking up for Justice, Home Office Report 1998 
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1.5 As S.41 is the current legislative stance on the admittance of sexual history evidence 
specific detail will be paid to judging exactly where it has failed in order to correct this in any 
suggestion for reform. As such, a chapter will be devoted to empirical studies carried out 
over the last decade. This includes reports by Kelly, Temkin and Griffiths for the Home 
Office,6 Neil Kibble7 and also the Burman8 study of the situation in Scotland to offer 
comparison. These studies, as well as others discussed in the third chapter offer tangible 
evidence of the successes and failures of S.41 and the current legislative stance on sexual 
history evidence in England and Wales. In particular they will focus on the attrition rate, the 
conviction rate and judicial opinion of the gateways. 
 
1.6 The thesis culminates in the fourth chapter which critiques the current options for 
reform which have been put forward in the last decade, following the implementation of the 
YJCEA. It evaluates each option in order to suggest which combination of ideas would be 
the best way to proceed. Whilst some ideas for a full legislative overhaul have been made, 
this has not been successful in the past therefore it is also important to look at the other, 
more procedural ideas as well. This thesis supports the idea of overturning R v A, thoroughly 
enforcing the crown court rules and ensuring S.41 is allowed to run as it was meant to. Only 
then can a judgement be made as to whether it will be successful. 
 
1.7 This research is crucial for three main reasons. Firstly because the law regarding 
sexual history evidence has become incredibly confused following the two major legislative 
changes and the current stance is lacking in clarity. And, more broadly, because the current 
conviction rate for rape is incredibly low.9 Whilst the use of sexual history evidence may be 
only one contributing factor to this problem, if the situation can be improved upon, it should 
                                                
6 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 7 Kibble, ‘Judicial Perspectives on Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999’ 
(2004) as well as the two articles in the Criminal Law Review written to discuss the findings of his 
report; Kibble, Neil,  ‘Judicial Perspectives on the operation of Section 41 and the relevance and 
admissibility of  prior sexual history evidence: four scenarios: Part 1’ (2005) Crim LR 190 and Kibble, 
Neil, ‘Judicial Discretion and admissibility of prior sexual history evidence under Section 41 of the 
YJCEA 1999: sometimes sticking to your guns mean shooting yourself in the foot: Part 2’ (2005) Crim 
LR 263 8 Burman, Jamieson, Nicholson, ‘The Law of Evidence in Sexual offence trials – Base Line Study’ 
(2005) 
 9 Op. cit 2 
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be. It is also the view of this thesis that sexual history evidence is rarely relevant to rape 
trials and therefore on principle, anything which can be done to restrict its use, should be 
done.  
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2. The Background and History of the Use of Sexual History Evidence in England and Wales 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 This chapter will offer a background for the thesis as a whole. Firstly it will concern 
itself with outlining how sexual history evidence has been treated by the common law in the 
past. It will then go on to investigate how the law’s stance on the inclusion of this evidence 
changed following the Heilbron Report in 1975, and the subsequent 1976 Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act that it catalysed. This background will be coloured by real case examples 
that directly influenced the state of the law to date. It will cover theories and arguments both 
prior, and subsequent to, the Heilbron Report and the creation of Section 2 surrounding the 
use of sexual history evidence in order to set the scene for this thesis as a whole.  
 
2.1.2 The focus of the thesis is on the legislative restrictions on the use of sexual history 
evidence; and to ultimately suggest how the current legislation could be reformed. As such, 
this chapter and the subsequent chapters must analyse the previous legislative stances 
which have resulted in the current climate. This chapter will focus on the build up to s.2 and 
the ways in which the case of R v Morgan10 and the Heilbron report brought about this 
legislative change and will then proceed to assess the success of s.2 by looking at the way 
subsequent cases have interpreted it.  
 
2.2 Common Law  
2.2.1 Prior to s.2 the regulation of sexual history evidence in rape trials was regulated by 
the common law. The common law in relation to the use of a woman’s sexual history in rape 
trials ‘[appears] to have crystallised in the nineteenth century,’11at which time Temkin 
suggests that such evidence was put into two main categories; firstly to suggest that the 
complainant was not a trustworthy witness and secondly as being relevant to whether she 
had consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant on the occasion in question.12 There 
                                                10 (1975) 2 WLR 913 11 Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 33 
I.C.L.Q p. 942 12 Ibid at p. 943 
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was a definite divide between evidence of past sexual intercourse with the defendant and 
evidence with third parties. 
 
2.2.2 In order to discuss the situation at common law thoroughly sexual history evidence 
can be separated out into categories as they would have been looked at in the courts in the 
19th and 20th Century. These can be labelled as previous sexual intercourse with the 
defendant, evidence of prostitution13 and evidence with third parties. This final category 
could be split into two further groups to differentiate between sexual history evidence that 
was widely known; for example if she was a known prostitute or was reputed to be 
promiscuous and evidence which was, to the general public and most likely the defendant, 
unknown.  Evidence on prostitution or promiscuity will be tackled separately.  
 
2.3 Evidence of Previous Sexual Intercourse with the Defendant 
 
2.3.1 Kibble notes the assumption that evidence of prior sexual relations with the 
defendant will obviously be admissible and has rarely been challenged.14 Previous sexual 
intercourse with the defendant “was considered to be relevant both to the complainant’s 
credit as well as to the issue of whether she had consented to the defendant on the occasion 
in question. Thus, where in cross-examination she denied previous sexual intercourse with 
the defendant, evidence could be led to contradict her,”15 for examples see R v Riley16 and R 
v Cockcroft.17   
 
2.4 Evidence of Prostitution or ‘Notorious for Want of Chastity’18 
 
2.4.1 In the same way that evidence could be brought to contradict a woman who says she 
had not previously had sexual relations with the defendant, so too, could evidence be 
                                                
13 Though I label this category as relating to prostitution, it will become apparent that this will also refer to woman 
whose behaviour was at the time considered not to be much better than that of a prostitute. I.E. she was 
‘notorious for want on chastity’ as was said in Greatbanks (1959) Crim. L. R. 450. 14 Kibble, Neil, “The Relevance and Admissibility of Prior Sexual History with the Defendant in Sexual Offences 
Cases” (2001) 32 L. Cambrian Rev 27 at p. 32 15 Ibid 16 (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 481 Evidence was brought in to contradict the complainant by proving there had been a 
prior connection between herself and the defendant. This evidence was admissible. 17 (1870) 11 Cox C.C. 410  18 Greatbanks (1959) Crim. L. R. 450 
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brought to contradict her on issues of prostitution. The complainant could be asked if she 
was a prostitute and the defence could lead evidence to the same effect.19 R v Clarke20 held 
that “general evidence could be called to establish that a woman was a prostitute, ‘a woman 
of abandoned character’” in that it might be relevant and was, therefore, admissible as 
tending to prove consent.21 Confirmed in R v Tissington,22 evidence of solicitation, “general 
want of decency,” could be called. But the court noted “there is a difference between the 
woman who has acts of sexual intercourse with men and a prostitute who regularly sells her 
body.”23 Notorious behaviour was often used to imply that the woman was or had been a 
prostitute. This could mean, as in the case of R v Clay24 that the woman had been a 
prostitute decades ago. 
 
2.4.2 However, to be considered “notorious for want of chastity”25 a woman does not have 
to have been a prostitute at all. The evidence was considered relevant, not only to the issue 
of credit, but also to consent. So, for example, in R v Barker26 it was held that evidence could 
be used to show the “general light character of the prosecutrix” to suggest she was a 
streetwalker. Other cases like R v Clarke27 and R v Tissington28 take the link between a 
woman of “bad” or “abandoned” character and prostitution itself even further. Heilbron picks 
up on this link “in these cases the descriptive phrases such as “notoriously loose or bad 
character” which were used, referred to a prostitute or woman behaving in a similar 
manner.”29  
 
2.4.3 If the complainant were a prostitute, or where her behaviour fell just short of 
prostitution,30 or as the courts phrased it, was “notorious for want of chastity,”31 she “could 
                                                
19 Op cit 14 20 (1817) 2 Stark 241 21 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 94 22 (1843) 1 Cox 48 23 Bashir (1969) 3 All E.R. at p. 693 and quoted in Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The 
Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 33 I.C.L.Q p. 943 24R v Clay (1851) 5 Cox 146 Evidence was admitted that the victim had been seen twenty years earlier ‘on the 
streets of Shrewsbury as a reputed prostitute.’ 25 Op. cit 18 26 (1829) 3 C. & P. 589 27 (1817) 2 Stark 241 28 (1843) 1 Cox C.C. 48 29 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 99 and 
quoted in Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 
33 I.C.L.Q p. 944 30 See for example Krausz (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 466 in which it was decided that a high degree of promiscuity 
which just falls short of prostitution would be regarded in the same light. 31 Op. cit 18 
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not merely be cross examined about this but witnesses could be called by the defence, as 
this evidence was regarded as being relevant not merely to credit but also to whether she 
had consented to the defendant on the occasion in question.”32 
 
2.5 Evidence of Sexual History with Third Parties 
 
2.5.1 This type of evidence and cross examination, as opposed to allegations of 
prostitution or similar, “has always stood on a different footing and understandably so.”33 The 
reason for pursuing this line of questioning was put forward in Heilbron as being, that it casts 
doubt on the credibility of the woman. “The fact that she has had prior sexual experiences, it 
is said, tends to prove she is an untruthful or unreliable witness, or as it is sometimes put ‘it 
tends to destroy her credit.’”34 The logical reasoning for why this is, is not explained.  
 
2.5.2 The case law shows that a woman’s sexual history evidence with third parties 
“tended to fall into two major categories; first, that she was notoriously immoral, and second 
that she had previously had sexual contact with someone other than the defendant.”35 The 
second of these categories goes without saying; of course a woman who has had sexual 
intercourse with third parties has had sexual intercourse with someone other than the 
defendant. The first category however, about being notoriously immoral, is extremely 
judgemental. A complainant who has had sexual relations before the incident in question 
cannot be deemed immoral simply for this reason. This kind of attitude demonstrates exactly 
why a woman’s sexual history evidence was deemed so relevant. However it is extremely 
narrow minded. Evidence of sexual relationships in the past, with third parties, was 
considered evidence which was relevant to a woman’s credibility or as Temkin puts it “her 
sexual activity was regarded as an indication of a lack of truthfulness or reliability as a 
witness.”36 Therefore cross examination about any previous relationships was allowed to be 
                                                
32 Temkin, Jennifer  ‘Sexual History Evidence – the ravishment of Section 2’ (1993) Crim LR 3, p. 3 33 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 101 34Ibid at para 102 35 Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987) p. 69 36 Op. cit 32 
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carried out by the defence. Though it should be noted that the answers given by her were 
final and further evidence could not be led to contradict her.37  
 
 
2.5.3 However, “where the complainant’s sexual activities were not a matter of public 
knowledge...the common law generally treated any acts of sexual intercourse between 
herself and men other than the defendant as relevant to credit but not to consent.”38 Temkin 
thinks that “some writers have blurred the clear conceptual distinction which the common law 
drew between those women whose sexual behaviour was public or notorious and those who 
might have been sexually active but did not fall into this category.”39 The difference being 
that it is possible that the complainant could have had many sexual partners which the 
defendant has no idea about and therefore they cannot have influenced his state of mind in 
the alleged rape. 
 
2.6 The Heilbron Report40 
2.6.1 The formation of the committee 
 
2.6.1.1 Although R v Morgan41 was not specifically focused on the use of sexual history 
evidence it is crucial to set the background for rape law as it forced attention to be paid to 
this area. On the other hand, the decision in any one case is not usually enough to spark 
such a reaction and therefore, having looked at the state of rape law in the UK over the 
previous century it is obvious the report was needed to assess what needed to be done. 
Essentially, R v Morgan acted as a final straw.  The Advisory group was established as a 
result of widespread concern from society as a whole to the decision in R v Morgan or as 
Temkin puts it, “to assuage public wrath over the decision.”42  
 
2.6.1.2 By the time the case of R v Morgan came along the law regarding rape was in a state 
for concern. This case has been labelled the “event which sparked second wave feminist 
                                                37 See for example; Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox C.C. 410 and Holmes (1871) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 334 38 Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 33 
I.C.L.Q p. 944 however note the exception to this rule in R v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr. App. R 466 39 Op. cit 11 at p. 945 40 Ibid 41 (1975) 2 WLR 913 
42 Op. cit 11 at p 948 
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activism in relation to rape law”43 when the House of Lords declared that a man could not be 
found guilty of rape if he had an honest, even if unreasonable, belief that the woman was 
consenting. Hailed as the “rapist’s charter,”44 it would remain good law for twenty-five years 
or so.45 However the decision in this case caused “widespread concern...by the public, the 
media and in parliament”46 and as a result the Heilbron report which was commissioned after 
the judgment to “give urgent consideration to the law of rape in the light of recent public 
concern and to advise the Home Secretary whether early changes in the law are 
desirable.”47  
 
2.6.1.3 The facts of R v Morgan were as follows: Morgan (37) and three co-defendants; 
McDonald (21), McClarty (27) and Parker (20) spent the evening of 15 August 1973 
together. They were all members of the RAF though Morgan was older and more senior to 
the others. He was married and he invited the men home to have intercourse with his wife 
telling them that she may struggle a bit but that this excited her and would welcome the 
intercourse with all of them. She struggled violently but all three men had intercourse with 
her, by force and without her consent. After the three men left the room her husband also 
forced her to have intercourse with him. Afterward she grabbed her coat and ran from the 
house, to the hospital making an immediate complaint of rape. Although this case does not 
specifically relate to sexual history evidence, it brought about the Heilbron Report and 
therefore is an integral part of this history. 
 
2.6.1.4  “Much of the criticism [received is directed] against the practice and 
procedure followed in rape cases,”48 most notably for the purposes of this thesis, the report 
was very critical of the way in which a complainant’s sexual history was used to prejudice the 
jury against her.49 For the purposes of this chapter, and this thesis, I shall only refer to the 
sections of the report which focus on the use of sexual history evidence.  
 
                                                
43 McGlynn, Clare, Feminist Activism and Rape Law Reform in England and Wales: A Sisyphean Struggle? in 
McGlynn & Munro, ‘Rethinking Rape Law’ (Routledge – Cavendish, 2010) 44 Temkin, Jennifer,  Rape and the Legal Process (2nd Edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) at p. 119 45 Op. cit 41  
46 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 1 47 Ibid at para 2 48 Op. cit 33 at para 85 
49 Easton, Susan, ‘The Use of Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials’ in Childs, Mary & Ellison, Louise, 
‘Feminist Perspectives on Evidence’ (Cavendish Publishing, London 2000) at p. 169 
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2.6.2 Aims of the Committee 
 
2.6.2.1 The aims behind the report and their recommendations were to “reduce the ordeal of 
the genuine rape victim” whilst “[achieving] fairness to the accused.”50 It was argued this was 
justifiable both on humanitarian grounds and in encouraging rape victims to come forward.51 
If more rape victims came forward the hope is that the conviction rate would increase. 
Heilbron also felt the recommendations were justifiable on the ground that if irrelevant 
evidence was excluded, it would be “easier for juries to arrive at a true verdict.”52  
 
2.6.3 The Recommendations made on Sexual History Evidence 
 
2.6.3.1 Heilbron approaches evidence of sexual history with the defendant and with third 
parties as separate issues. The general stance taken is that evidence introduced simply to 
encourage a jury to have a negative opinion of the woman should not be allowed, as her 
general character cannot be considered an indicator as to whether she consented on any 
given occasion.  
 
2.6.4 Evidence with Third Parties 
 
2.6.4.1 Heilbron reached the conclusion that, “the previous sexual history of the alleged 
victim with third parties is of no significance so far as credibility is concerned, and is only 
rarely likely to be relevant to issues directly before the jury.”53 This seems to be because of a 
societal shift to a position in which women can engage in sexual relations with men in a far 
more casual way than ever before. As the report puts it “There exists...a gap between the 
assumptions underlying the law and those public views and attitudes which exist today which 
ought to influence today’s law.”54 This could be for several different factors. Firstly the lack of 
statutory definition of rape meant that the definition of rape has developed through the case 
law as opposed to any radical statutory means. Secondly, and very importantly, whilst 
Heilbron makes assumptions about societal attitudes, rape myths, as can be seen later on 
this thesis, are still extremely prevalent. Therefore whilst on some level a woman has more 
                                                
50 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 133 51 Ibid 52 Ibid 53 Ibid at para 131 54 Ibid 
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sexual freedom, she still risks all kinds of accusations and judgements if she exercises that 
freedom. 
 
2.6.4.2 Whilst consent to one man should not be allowed to infer the consent to another man 
the committee accepted that there may be situations whereby third party evidence could be 
relevant. The test they devised to allow such evidence in can be called the “strikingly similar” 
test. The report concluded that evidence would be allowed in where the scenario in the 
evidence was ‘strikingly similar’ to the situation surrounding the incident of the alleged rape. 
 
2.6.4.3 In short, the judges should permit cross-examination and allow evidence with third 
parties if he is satisfied;  
“a) that this evidence relates to behaviour on the part of the complainant which was strikingly 
similar to her alleged behaviour on the occasion of, or in relation to, events immediately 
preceding or following, the alleged offence; 
And 
b) that the degree of relevance of that evidence to issues arising in the trial is such that it 
would be unfair to the accused to exclude it.”55 
It was hoped that the legislation would adopt a similar format to what has been laid out. 
There were also procedural recommendations put forward which meant that the application 
to the judge to admit such evidence would be made in advance without the jury present.  
 
2.6.5 Evidence with the Defendant 
 
2.6.5.1 Evidence of sexual history evidence with the defendant was considered differently to 
third parties. The committee decided that this type of evidence was generally “relevant to the 
issues involved in a trial for rape, subject always to the power of the judge to control 
improper questioning.”56 Therefore the report concluded that evidence with the defendant 
should be allowed with restrictions as enforced by the judge. He would be allowed to use his 
discretion to allow in evidence where he felt that its exclusion would result in an unfair trial.  
 
                                                
55 Ibid at para 137 56 Ibid at para 134 
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2.6.6 Problems with Heilbron 
 
2.6.6.1 The main problem of this approach to evidence with the defendant is that Heilbron is 
suggesting that we rely solely on the discretion of the judge in deciding what should and 
should not be allowed in. The judge will be given the guideline that it would result in an unfair 
trial to exclude such evidence however this would seem like a very subjective statement. 
There is also a hidden rape myth in this admittance which is that consent to the defendant 
on a previous occasion may automatically lead to the assumption of consent on a number of 
other occasions. It is not the case necessarily that when a woman consents to one man that 
she will always thereafter consent to him. Unfortunately this rule of inclusion, whilst not 
actively enforcing this myth, does nothing to counter it. 
 
2.6.6.2 Later in this thesis the problem of judge’s own opinions and their general lenience 
with regards to this type of evidence will be discussed. However, at this stage it is still 
important to note that the committee are putting a lot of faith in the judge being impartial. 
Particularly in the 70s when views of a woman’s sexuality were even less progressive than 
they are today. Use of Section 2 will show that the judges did not manage to work as 
impartially as Heilbron had hoped.  Giving the judge this control is a “compromise with the 
more extreme view which would exclude the complainant’s sexual history completely” which 
was viewed as unfavourable as this could, in some cases, be unjust to the accused. As 
examples the report cites; R v Krausz,57 R v Tissington,58 R v Clay,59 R v Riley,60 R v 
Greatbanks61 and R v Bashir.62  
In comparison to some of the later restrictions recommended against sexual history 
evidence, Heilbron’s suggestions seem relatively lenient however it may be that it only 
seems this way with hindsight. After all it was stated that the number of cases this was 
envisaged to effect was small as Heilbron labelled these cases “exceptional.”63 
 
 
2.6.6.3 Given that the government chose not to follow Heilbron on many of its most important 
recommendations; for example, the similar fact suggestion, the commentary on the report 
                                                
57 (1973) 57 Cr. App R 466 58 (1843) 1 Cox 48 59 (1851) 5 Cox 146 60 (1887) 18 QBD 481 61 (1959) Crim L R 450 62(1969) 3 All ER 692 63 Op. cit 50 at para 136 
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often goes hand in hand with the disappointment of Section 2. This is perhaps because, the 
report itself had some very good ideas which critics approved of. Adler saw the approach as 
a “radical challenge to the assumptions arguing as it does that whatever a woman’s sexual 
experience with partners of her choice, it cannot logically be construed as a general 
willingness to consent to sexual intercourse or as an indication of untruthfulness.”64 The 
report was “very critical”65 that a complainant’s sexual history was used in this way, to 
prejudice the jury against her. However the subsequent legislation and its use does not 
seem to echo this sentiment. 
 
2.7 Section 2 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 
 
2.7.1 A copy of section 2 can be found in Appendix 1. 
Section 2 did implement some of the proposals from the Heilbron report in order to “tackle 
the sexual history issue,”66but the “strikingly similar” formula did not make it onto the statute 
book. Instead it states that where sexual history evidence with a third party is concerned, it 
should not be admitted by the judge except where it would be unfair to the defendant to 
exclude it. But as Temkin points out the decision of unfairness rests with the judge who has 
contributed to such free use of sexual history evidence in the past.67 Therefore it seems odd 
that section 2 essentially gave judges ultimate power when it comes to deciding which 
evidence to allow in and which to exclude. Adler describes the situation by saying “while, on 
the face of it, the Act appears to overrule the precedents established in the nineteenth 
century, it also seems to leave a good deal to the trial judge’s discretion.”68 She goes on to 
say that because of this “broad discretionary legislation” there is “a very real possibility that 
the absence of specific guidelines will lead judges to incorporate the assumptions reflected 
in nineteenth century case law into their interpretation of the new Act.”69 
 
 
                                                
64 Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987) p. 72 
65 Op. cit 50 66 Op. cit 32 at p. 4 67 Ibid 68 Op. cit 64 69 Ibid 
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2.8 Judicial Interpretation of Section 2 
 
2.8.1 The proof of legislation is how it works once enacted. This section will analyse the 
direction in which the cases and legislative interpretation went following the enactment of 
section 2 in order to provide a thorough overview of the history of the use of sexual history 
evidence.  At the same time this section will voice some of the academic views on section 2 
and its enactment.  
 
2.8.2 In practice applications under Section 2, “although not universal, are certainly a good 
deal less exceptional than the Heilbron Group or Parliament intended’ at a success rate of 
75%.70In terms of the case law Temkin argues that ‘matters got off to a bad start”71 in 
Lawrence72 where it was decided that questions about the complainant’s relationships with 
other men should only be allowed where they “might reasonably lead the jury, properly 
directed in the summing up, to take a different view of the complainant’s evidence from that 
which they might take it the question or series of questions was or were not allowed.” But as 
Temkin points out this is “the whole nub of problem” because if a jury is told about a 
woman’s sexual past they may well take a different view of the evidence presented.73 This is 
partly because rape myths are still extremely prevalent in society as whole and not just the 
courts. Section 2 is unsatisfactory because it attempts to solve the problem of sexual history 
evidence with the word “reasonably”74 when clearly a more decisive statement was needed, 
like the “strikingly similar” doctrine offered in Heilbron. Empirical studies75 show that the 
operation of Section 2 was still allowing irrelevant questions in, in order to discredit the 
complainant.76 This empirical evidence in fact shows that Section 2 has had little effect on 
the admission of sexual history evidence.77 Sadly, R v Lawrence was followed in R v Mills78 
and R v Fenlon. 
 
                                                
70 Op. cit 64 at p. 73 71 Op. cit 32 at p. 4 72 (1977) Crim. L. R. 492 and then this formula was approved in the case of Mills (1978) 68 Cr. App. R. 327 73 Op. cit 32 p. 4 74 Ibid for a discussion of this. 75 For example Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987) 
76 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence in 
rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 at p 12 77 See Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987) 
78 (1978) 68 Cr App R 327 (CA) 
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2.8.3 Shortly after the implementation of the legislation academic commentary already 
seemed unfavourable. “On the face of it, this solution appears to have been less than 
satisfactory.”79 Easton explains the limited impact of Section 2, not having the desired effect 
“as counsel continued to ask questions on sexual history, and when leave was requested it 
was rarely refused.”80 She goes on to say how even when evidence is refused entry, appeals 
are often successful in allowing it in.81 The main problem being that whilst recommendations 
had been made in the law, the “myths and stereotypes underpinning the old law survived”82 
and in many ways, still do. Firth backs this up by saying that since Parliament’s failure to 
implement these provisions to reform the common law “this area of law has been steeped in 
controversy.”83  
 
2.8.4 Perhaps one of the main problems was that whilst section 2 contained a provision to 
deal with sexual history evidence with third parties, meaning that it was not, in theory, freely 
admitted, sexual history evidence with the defendant “continued to be freely admissible.”84 
The Heilbron proposals aimed to give the judges “far less scope to decide when such 
evidence should be admitted.”85 As Henning and Bronitt state “the principal structural flaw of 
these legislative schemes is their failure to define the key concepts for determining 
admissibility” which leaves judges to their own “common sense assumptions.”86 
Unfortunately, other jurisdictions, namely Victoria and Tanzania were also working on similar 
reforms at the time section 2 came in and Temkin says it “compares unfavourably with both 
provisions.”87 And perhaps the most shocking revelation Adler reveals “is that defending 
counsel often ignored section 2 altogether and not infrequently with the connivance of the 
judge.”88 Temkin closes by saying that even after the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act, 
                                                
79 Op. cit 77 at p 11 80 Easton, Susan, ‘The Use of Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials’ in Childs, Mary & Ellison, Louise, 
‘Feminist Perspectives on Evidence’ (Cavendish Publishing, London 2000)p. 171 81 Ibid 82 For more on rape myths see Temkin, Jennifer,  Rape and the Legal Process (2nd Edn Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2002), Lees, Sue, Carnal Knowledge Rape on Trial (2nd Edn The Women’s Press, London 2002) and 
Adler, Zsuzsanna, Rape on Trial (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, New York 1987)  83 Firth, Georgina, ‘The Rape Trial and Sexual History Evidence – R v A and the (Un)worthy Complainant’ (2006) 
NILQ [Vol. 57, No.3] p. 445 84 Ibid  at  p. 446 85 Henning, T. And Bronitt, S. ‘Rape victims on trial: regulating the use and abuse of sexual history evidence. In 
P. Easteal (Ed.) Balancing the Scales: Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture. Sydney: The Federation Press 
quoted in Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 at p 12 86 Ibid 87 Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 33 
I.C.L.Q p 962 88 Discussed in Temkin, Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ 
(1984) 33 I.C.L.Q p 976 
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“victims of rape are still victimised by the criminal justice system” and that the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee’s Report did little to dispel this belief.89  
 
2.8.5 Despite Heilbron’s stance that sexual history evidence was generally irrelevant to 
consent, it declared that in cases like R v Krausz,90 it could be so relevant. The defendant, 
Krausz, claimed the complainant had consented to intercourse but afterward had demanded 
money. Upon refusal he submits that she cried rape. He wished to introduce evidence that 
she was in the habit of having sex with men she did not know and then asking for money. 
Heilbron concluded that, in such a case, evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual 
conduct would be relevant to the issue of consent.91 Smith argues that this is actually not an 
issue of consent but one of credibility similar to the reasoning applied in R v Boardman92 on 
similar fact.93 That is, that is was not her conduct or how many people she’d slept with in the 
past per se, simply that this set of facts is too similar to a previous incident to be a 
coincidence.  
 
2.8.6 In Viola, Lord Lane apparently overlooked the common law position and deemed 
sexual history evidence generally relevant to the issue of consent.94This was subsequently 
followed by R v Redguard,95 R v Bogie,96 R v SMS97 and R v Brown.98 R v Viola99 approved 
the Lawrence test100 and furthered this by saying “if the questions are relevant to an issue in 
the trial in the light of the way the case is being run, for instance relevant to the issue of 
consent, as opposed to merely credit, they are likely to be admitted.”101 The facts of R v 
Viola were that during an incident with the police the defendant had thrown his car keys into 
the doorway of the complainant’s home. He had knocked so that she might help him find 
them to which she obliged as she was slightly acquainted with him. She brought a lighted 
                                                89 Ibid at p 978 90 (1973) Cr App R 466 91 McColgan, Aileen, ‘Common Law and Relevance of Sexual History Evidence’ (1996) 16 OJLS HL 275 p 294 92 (1975) AC 421 93 Smith, J. C., ‘The Heilbron Report’ (1976) Crim L R at 103-4 cited in McColgan, Aileen, ‘Common Law and 
Relevance of Sexual History Evidence’ (1996) 16 OJLS HL 275 p 294 94 Op. cit 92 at p 283 95 (1991) Crim L R 213 96 (1992) Crim L R 301 97 (1992) Crim L R 310 98 (1989) 89 Cr App R 97 99 (1982) 75 Cr App R 125 100 (1977) Crim. L. R. 492 The test states that questions about the complainant’s sexual relationships with other 
men should be allowed only where they “might reasonably lead the jury, properly directed in the summing up, to 
take a different view of the complainant’s evidence from that which they might take if the question or series of 
question was or were not allowed.” 101 (1982) 1 WLR at 130 
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paper to aid the search and permitted him to enter the maisonette so that he could see from 
the window if the police were still there. It is then that she alleges he raped her. He claims 
she invited him in for a drink and that the sexual intercourse which took place between them 
was consensual. He did however, initially deny the intercourse to the police but later 
changed his story. The defence wished to call evidence relating to a few different scenarios; 
one happened earlier in the evening and concerned friends of the complainant’s boyfriend 
during which the complainant supposedly consumed alcohol with the men and then 
suggested they may wish to try out her new bed before massaging one of them. The second 
related to a sighting of a naked man in her house save for his slippers nine hours after the 
rape. Both pieces of evidence were allowed. The problem here is that the defence can make 
it look like she “may well have been in the mood for sexual intercourse with any man.”102 The 
relevance was said to rest on the proximity of the alleged rape and the consensual sexual 
behaviour.103 Temkin says this “took us from bad to worse” because “it left the door open for 
rulings that evidence of past sexual experience was in any particular case relevant to the 
issue of consent and therefore admissible.”104 The issue of promiscuity was covered again in 
R v Brown105where the appeal was based on the fact that the trial judge had excluded 
evidence of the complainant’s alleged promiscuity. (She had a 6 month old son, a casual 
relationship with a man who was not the father of the child and at a later date found to have 
a trace of venereal disease.)106 The appeal was allowed. After Viola the court concluded that 
this case neared the borderline because “the complainant was prepared to have intercourse 
with a number of different men.”107 The court went on to say that with cases which were near 
the border it may help the jury to know about her past in order to explain what happened in 
this incident. For example, as Temkin explains, in Brown her failure to shout for help as she 
was dragged away or her failure to tell the taxi driver who brought her home were seen as 
indications of her attitude toward sexual relations.108 The implication is one of promiscuity.  
 
                                                
102 This is not the view held in the article – simply a comment made that the jury may see it this way. Temkin, 
Jennifer ‘Regulating Sexual History Evidence – The Limits of Discretionary Legislation’ (1984) 33 I.C.L.Q p. 971 103 Op. cit 92 at p 283 104 Temkin, Jennifer  ‘Sexual History Evidence – the ravishment of Section 2’ (1993) Crim LR 3 p. 5 105 (1989)  89 Cr App R 97 106 Temkin references research at St. Mary’s Hospital, London, which found 30% of women who attended a clinic 
after being raped were suffering from, venereal diseases.  Temkin, Jennifer  ‘Sexual History Evidence – the 
ravishment of Section 2’ (1993) Crim LR 3 p. 6 107 (1982) 75 Cr App R at p 130 and discussed in Temkin, Jennifer  ‘Sexual History Evidence – the ravishment of 
Section 2’ (1993) Crim LR 3 p. 6 108 Op. cit 32 at p. 6 
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2.8.7 In many cases the defence often failed even to make an application to the judge and 
would simply use it in courts without permission. In the case of R v Bogie109 this situation 
arose in relation to promiscuity. The complainant had no regular income or permanent 
residence and was staying with friends. On the night of the alleged rape however she was 
offered a place to stay in a building which an acquaintance of hers was the caretaker for. 
She agreed and upon arrival at the building he suggested she remove her clothes so they 
did not crease and offered her a shirt instead. It was then that she alleged, whilst lying on a 
mattress, he raped her. She was found shortly after leaving the premises, by a security 
guard who described her being “in quite a state, sobbing as if broken-hearted.”110He took her 
to the police and she reported the rape. The police returned to the building where they 
arrested the defendant, who denied the charge and threatened that his mates would kill the 
complainant. During the complainant’s medical examination it was found that she was 
scratched and bruised. In court the prosecution asked the defendant why he thought the 
complainant would be willing to have sex with him. He said she was an “easy lay” and had 
intercourse with his friends. Only after this had been said did the judge intervene to prevent 
further questions. As Temkin points out, since the defendant had made similar accusations 
to the police, the prosecution should have anticipated this type of response and if they 
wanted to pursue this line of questioning, an application under section 2 should have been 
made.111 
 
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
2.9.1 This chapter has offered a background to the use of sexual history evidence in rape 
law in the UK.  It documents the first major legislative change in this area and how it came 
about as well as the reaction to that legislation and how the courts have handled it since. 
 
2.9.2 It is important to note the growing sense of unease with the legislative situation and 
the way sexual history evidence was being used at the time because this sets the context for 
                                                
109 (1992) Crim L.R. 301 110 (1992) Crim L.R. 301 at p. 3 of the transcript 111 Op. cit 32 at  p. 8 
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the next legislative change in Section 41. The judiciary may well have supported S.2 
because it allowed them a great deal of discretion. The volume of cases in which sexual 
history evidence was introduced was high with three in four applications being accepted.112 
Heilbron suggested that the cases in which such evidence would be allowed were 
“exceptional.”113 75% is not an exception, but a majority. And not only was the legislation 
being over used, it was also being under-used in the respect that often cases would simply 
by-pass the provisions and raise the evidential matters in court rather than creating the 
proper application.114 
 
2.9.3 This misuse led to the Speaking up for Justice Home Office report in 1999 after a 
committee was formed in order to decide how to deal with the growing concern and 
considerable misuse of S.2 and the use of sexual history evidence. The next chapter will 
continue to look at how the dissatisfaction and misuse of S.2 led to the Home Office report of 
1999 and subsequently the implementation of S.41 YJCEA 1999. 
 
 
  
                                                
112Op. cit 64 at p. 73 113 Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape (the Heilbron Committee) Cmnd 6352 (1975) at para 136 114 For example in the case of Bogie [1992] Crim L.R. 301 
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3. S.41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 As we have seen from the previous chapter, the legislation regulating the use of 
sexual history evidence, found in S.2 has been heavily criticised. As a result of this, the 
government decided it was time to review the law in this area and consequently S.41 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 was produced to deal with these issues. This 
chapter will provide a detailed analysis of Section 41 of the YJCEA 1999. It will set out the 
aims and ideas behind the implementation of S. 41 by looking to the Speaking up for Justice 
Report and the legislative process which led to its enactment. The problems of S.2 have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter so they will not be fully discussed again 
here, however it can be stated that while the new legislation had several aims behind its 
inception, one of the main reasons for its creation was because of the problems Section 2 
had previously caused which needed to be rectified in the new legislation. It will then go on 
to provide a detailed analysis of each of the gateways in Section 41 through which sexual 
history evidence can be introduced in court. It will highlight the positives and the flaws with 
each gateway. Having analysed the wording of each of the gateways the chapter will go on 
to look at how the courts have interpreted S. 41 by looking at the case law and commentary 
for each of the exceptions. 
 
3.2 The Aims of S.41 
 
3.2.1 First we must ask, from where the need for new legislation came. Birch says that S. 
41 was “enacted on a wave of invective against the courts for failing to give proper effect to 
earlier legislation on sexual history evidence.”115 Temkin sees Birch’s work as “[harking] back 
wistfully to the good old days when S.2 prevailed” however she describes the legislation as 
“deeply flawed, permitting a wide use of sexual history evidence whenever it was deemed by 
the trial judge to be relevant to the issue of consent.”116 Therefore she points out that “[it was] 
                                                115 Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531 
116 Temkin, Jennifer, ‘Sexual History Evidence – Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Crim LR 217 at p 218 
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concluded the legislation has not achieved its aims”117 and this is the reason for fresh 
legislation in S.41. Spencer on the other hand considers that s.41 was introduced simply 
because “feminists complained that judges gave leave too readily.”118 I must agree with 
Temkin here when she asserts that the feminist complaints are not actually unfounded and it 
is as though he thinks there is “nothing at all to support such complaints.”119 However, as the 
chapter will go on to discuss there was large amounts of empirical evidence available at the 
time which would suggest sexual history evidence was being used far too frequently and that 
the attrition rate for rape was very high. For these reasons, Spencer’s argument that this was 
brought about purely due to feminist action with nothing to back up the complaints seems 
rather ineffective. 
 
3.2.2 What can be said however is that in 1999 the government was “spurned into 
action”120 by a Home Office report; Speaking up for Justice. The report itself was 
commissioned in order to decide whether or not the current legislation was working 
effectively and to decide how best to proceed. We can look to this report, as well as Hansard 
for the parliamentary debates on this matter. 
 
3.3 The Home Office Report Speaking up for Justice 1999  
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
3.3.1.1 The Home Office report Speaking up for Justice was published in 1999 with the 
purpose of “addressing concerns that the present law [was] not working effectively.”121 It 
considers the legislation in the context of a high attrition rate for rape and empirical evidence 
showing that sexual history evidence was being used in around 75% of cases, often to 
discredit victims in the eyes of the jury.122 So we can gather an aim here is to limit the use of 
sexual history evidence. Research evidence of S.2 being used in courts shows that 
“interpreting the provision is widely variable and that it frequently is at variance with the 
                                                
117 Ibid  at p 221 118 Spencer, “Rape Shields and the Right to a Fair Trial” [2001] C.L.J. 452 commented on in Temkin, 
Jennifer, ‘Sexual History Evidence – Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Crim LR 217 at p 222 119 Op. cit 117 at p 222 120 Ibid 121 From the insert by Alun Michael in Speaking up for Justice 1999, Home Office.  122Paras 9.56 and 9.57 on Speaking up for Justice 1999, Home Office  
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intention of S.2.”123 This suggests a desire for tighter and clearer restrictions. The fact that 
evidence shows it was being used in 75% of cases backs this up as the point of S. 2 was 
that the use of sexual history evidence was to be restricted. The working group concluded 
that “there [was] overwhelming evidence that the present practice in the courts is 
unsatisfactory and that the existing law is not achieving its purpose.”124 
 
3.3.2 Options that the Working Group Considered 
3.3.2.1 The working group saw that there were two possible options with how to proceed in 
order to improve the law on sexual history evidence. Either to adapt the existing law or to 
change the law. They looked at improving the law through further guidance to courts in the 
form of a Court of Appeal judgment or by a practice discretion in order to bring judicial 
practice in to line with the actual wording of the current legislation. The working group were 
not convinced that this non-legislative option would be successful given that S.2 had 20 
years of operation behind it. It seems highly likely that this was the correct decision to make 
given that following such a vast amount of time under S.2 more weight was probably needed 
to effect change than simply a guidance in court. Creating new legislation is a far more 
forceful act. In addition to this, considering that judicial interpretation has been highly 
criticised under S.2 it would also seem wise to remove some of the power from the judges’ 
hands. Therefore they favoured a change in legislation. 
 
3.3.2.2 Having decided that a change in legislation was more favourable, the working group 
considered two different ways of changing the legislation to improve the problems that S.2 
created. The first option would be to remove the judge’s discretion to admit evidence of 
previous sexual history entirely while the second approach would be to more closely define 
the circumstances in which a judge may exercise his discretion. They concluded that to 
follow the first option would be to go against the recommendations set down in Heilbron 
because “there may be instances, albeit infrequent in which a complainant’s previous sexual 
history may be relevant to the case, and excluding this might not only be unfair, but could 
lead to the wrongful conviction of innocent defendants.”125 Therefore the second approach; 
                                                
123 Para 9.63 in Speaking up for Justice 1999, Home Office 124 Ibid 125 Para 9.67 in Speaking up for Justice 1999, Home Office 
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creating detailed legislative guidelines as to when the judge may use his discretion, was 
favoured by the working group. It is the solution which has been adopted in other 
jurisdictions such as Scotland, Canada and Australia.  
 
3.3.2.3 So “the working group [concluded] that the law should be amended to provide a more 
structured approach to decision taking and to set out more clearly when evidence of previous 
sexual history can be admitted in cases of rape.”126 It suggests possible models in Section 
274 and 275 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 or the New South Wales 
legislation favouring the Scottish approach with the precise formulation being the subject of 
consultation.  
 
3.4 The Legislative Process 
 
3.4.1 To fully understand S.41 and therefore judge its success it is essential to know how it 
came about. As the previous sections have covered, there was much dissatisfaction with S.2 
and the state of the law relating to sexual history evidence. However this section will focus 
on the legislative process which brought about S.41. It will look at the original bill, how it was 
initially received, what changes were made from it and why, in order to better understand the 
legislation in its final form. 
 
3.4.2 S.41 came out of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill of 1998-1999, the 
relevant section being Chapter 3 clauses 40 to 42. Clause 40 described restriction on 
evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history; clause 41 the interpretation and 
application of section 40 and; clause 42 procedure on applications under section 40.  Whilst 
the provisions do appear stricter than those of the 1976 Act, it was suggested by Lord 
Thomas of Gresford that they went no further than the current practice of the courts.127 The 
reactions to the bill were somewhat mixed. Whilst many of the commentators admitted there 
was an issue, there was also a consensus that perhaps legislative change was too radical. 
However, there was much acknowledgement of the need for change when it comes to the 
law of rape. In the Lord’s debate of July 8th it was said “undoubtedly, the law needs to give 
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better protection to witnesses.”128 This would suggest that any legislation that came out of 
this debate would be more focussed on the claimant’s rights than the defendant’s. This is 
because they recognise “all too often in the past, sexual history evidence has been brought 
into rape trials.”129 There is however, they point out, a problem with doing everything they 
had hoped for130 when it comes to limiting sexual history evidence. This is because “the rules 
on the admissibility of evidence must be framed in the light of the definition of rape contained 
in the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Understandably, we cannot have two inconsistent laws.”131 
In this respect Parliament appears to be very restricted but it is important to note that whilst 
they seem to desire more room to manoeuvre in terms of restricting sexual history evidence, 
they would not restrict the use of such evidence totally because, as they rightly point out, “it 
is inevitable that, in many rape cases, witnesses will have to give intimate and detailed 
sexual evidence.”132 The point here seems to be that the law wishes to offer as much 
protection as possible and only admit evidence where it is genuinely relevant. The aim 
therefore cannot be to remove the trauma of giving evidence of this sort entirely but to 
reduce it. The definition of rape on the statute book contains a defence in honest belief in 
consent which inevitably means that sexual history evidence cannot be limited totally. It 
does, however, beg the question why has this issue not been dealt with first? 
 
3.4.3 Tangible opposition can be seen in the debates when a number of the members of 
the House of Lords, including the Lord Chief Justice at the time (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) 
argued that “in their experience the current provisions of the 1976 Act, together with the 
guidance given by the courts, were sufficient, and that to tighten the legislative restrictions 
further could result in the exclusions of relevant evidence.”133They moved to delete all of 
clause 40 but on a vote the suggestion was defeated by 143 votes to 56.134 Oddly enough, 
there was also opposition by those who felt the provisions would not go far enough135but the 
government felt it “got the parliamentary structure right, by excluding not all evidence of 
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previous sexual behaviour but only irrelevant evidence.”136 There were however, some who 
backed the provisions in their original format. For example, Lord Lester, who said they were 
“well structured, carefully balanced and fair to both the accused and the witness.”137 
 
3.4.4 There was a notable change made to clause 40(3)(b)(i) which initially would have 
only allowed behavioural evidence within 24hrs of this alleged incident. There was, however, 
“considerable”138 opposition to time limit and therefore it was removed and replaced with “at 
or about the same time”. In many ways this was an odd amendment since the explanatory 
notes detailed that this was still meant to be interpreted as meaning “no more widely than 24 
hours before or after the offence.”139 There was also a government amendment to the Bill 
which added in a similarity element following a hypothetical situation suggested by Baroness 
Mallalieu in which it would be unreasonable to exclude such evidence.140 There had initially 
been no mention of a similarity gateway because the government took the view that a 
complainant’s sexual history is “simply not relevant to the question of whether there was 
consent on the occasion in point.”141However, after careful consideration of the treatment of 
such a gateway in other jurisdictions it was decided that such a provision would be added.  
 
3.4.5 So we can see that one of the main aims was to limit the use of sexual history 
evidence, but that this could not be achieved to the degree to which the government initially 
would have liked. They did however manage to introduce restrictions. These are “that 
refusing to give such evidence could lead the jury to an unsafe conclusion, that the main 
purpose of the evidence must not be to undermine the victim’s credibility, and that the 
evidence must relate to specific instances of sexual behaviour of the complainant.”142 The 
first restriction is crucial because it provides the balance between the complainant’s rights 
and the defendant’s rights. The second is a little more difficult because the defence could 
bring in evidence arguing the purpose is not to impugn the complainant’s credibility and try to 
show that this is simply an unfortunate side effect. However, how can the judge tell when the 
main purpose is to impugn her? And the final restriction is important as it prevents the 
                                                136 HL Deb 15 December 1998 cc1238 and 8th February 1999 c61 (Lord Williams of Mostyn.) 137 HL Dev 8th February 1998 cc47-8 138 House of Commons research paper 99/40 ‘The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Bill’ [HL] Bill 
74 of 1998-1999  at p 52 139 Explanatory notes to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 At para 143 140 HL Deb 8th February 1999 cc45-6 141 The Home Office Minister Lord Williams of Mostyn, HL Deb 15 December 1998 cc238-9 
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defence asking questions of the complainant that they do not necessarily know the answer 
to, or perhaps they know half the story. To limit the defence to specific instances is to try to 
limit them to knowledge they already possess. The implication of the debate is that 
parliament would have gone further but for the “ridiculous defence”143 which is available in 
the statute. They eloquently put it “as long as the defence of unreasonable, but honest belief 
in consent remains, unreasonable evidence may be admitted.”144 However one cannot help 
but wonder whether or not this similarity gateway could have been more tightly drafted so 
that this loophole would have at least partially been corrected.  
 
3.4.6 Lord Lester made an excellent observation during one debate when he stated 
“consent to engage in sexual relations in the past does not give a blank cheque for consent 
to engage in sexual relations in the future.”145 Firth agrees with this argument saying that she 
would generally argue “there is no logic in allowing evidence of a woman’s sexual history 
either as an assessment of her truthfulness or to show that the man believed that she 
consented.”146 She says that this is because “there is a difference between what a man has 
heard, which makes him think that she might consent if he makes an advance, and how she 
behaves when he does.”147 
 
3.4.7 Later on in the debate the aims behind restricting sexual history evidence are 
highlighted. A comment was made in debate that; “we are particularly concerned about the 
attrition rate in rape cases and the fact that so many vulnerable people will not come forward 
because of the sort of evidence that has been brought forward in the past.”148 The severity of 
this situation seems to have been realised in this debate and it is acknowledged within the 
discussion that the government are tackling the larger problem of the definition of rape. As 
she says, this is an essential because until the matter is resolved they “will not be able to 
give women victims confidence that the law will always protect them.”149 The problem of 
course being that there can be an unreasonable belief in consent as a defence. So whilst the 
short term aim may be to restrict sexual history evidence it is for the larger purpose of raising 
                                                143 Ibid 144 Hansard 8th July 1999 Column 1271 145 Lord Lester of herne Hill, Report Stage, 8 March 1999, Column 23 146 Firth, Georgina, ‘The Rape Trial and Sexual History Evidence – R v A and the (Un)worthy 
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the attrition rate by making it easier for women to come forward without fear of their sexual 
history being brought up solely to humiliate them.  
 
3.5 S.41 
 
3.5.1 Thus under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 S.41 was introduced 
to restrict the use of sexual history evidence. It adopts a blanket ban on sexual history 
evidence with a “categories approach”150 to the exclusions. In the first instance it is important 
to note how controversial a decision this was. On the surface it greatly reduces judicial 
discretion and prevents a lot of previously admissible evidence from entering the trial. 
Broadly speaking it prevents sexual history evidence and cross examination on such matters 
unless the result would be an unsafe verdict. On top of this, the evidence the defence wish to 
bring must fall into one of the gateways. The next section will go into each in detail but they 
can be defined as; an issue not relating to consent; an issue relating to consent, at or about 
the same time as the event in question; an issue relating to consent which is so similar that it 
cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence and the rebuttal gateway. 
 
3.5.2 Unfortunately it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the legislation in its original 
form because shortly after its inception the Law Lords pronounced judgment in the case of R 
v A which interpreted the legislation in to an almost unrecognisable state. They put the 
judicial discretion back into S.41 and thus, to a degree, undermined the gateways approach. 
More will be said on this case after the analysis of the gateways however it is important to 
bear in mind that this case has altered the way the section works. A copy of Sections 41 and 
42 can be found in the appendix. S.41(1) contains the blanket ban on sexual history 
evidence, the exceptions to this rule can be found in S.41(3) and more information on these 
exceptions can be found in the rest of this chapter. S.42 gives some additional interpretative 
guidance. 
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3.6 Analysis of the Gateways 
3.6.1 Introduction  
 
3.6.1.1 The exceptions are contained in S.41 and can be separated into four different 
gateways. In plain English these can be defined as, an issue not relating to consent; an 
issue relating to consent, at or about the same time as the event in question; an issue 
relating to consent which is so similar that it cannot reasonably be explained as a 
coincidence and the rebuttal gateway. In order to accurately assess whether or not the 
legislation has been a success this chapter will look at each of the gateways individually so 
that if some are more valuable than others the legislation can be judged fairly. 
 
3.6.2 Not an Issue of Consent, S.41(3)(a) 
3.6.2.1 Issue of consent is defined in S.42(1)(b) as “means any issue whether the 
complainant in fact consented to the conduct constituting the offence with which the accused 
is charged (and accordingly does not include any issue as to the belief of the accused that 
the complainant so consented).” 
 
3.6.2.2 Temkin gives several suggestions of the type of evidence that this gateway could 
include. These are: belief in consent; denial of sexual act by the defendant; motive to lie and 
instances where consent is not the issue.151 These can be dealt with individually because it 
may be the case that some will present more problems than others.  
 
3.6.3 Belief in Consent 
 
3.6.3.1 According to S.42(1)(b) “belief in consent” is not an issue of consent so it is not 
restricted by S.41(3)(c). It is a problematic defence discussed earlier in the aims section. It is 
allowed under this gateway as belief in consent is considered to be a separate issue to 
actual consent. This would include any evidence which could affect the defendant’s belief 
that the complainant consented. Unsurprisingly some “woman’s groups have objected 
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strongly to this exception, contending that it will create a substantial loophole in the law.”152 A 
gateway that allows in a defence of this kind could be very damaging to women. As was said 
in the parliamentary debates, this only highlights that whilst the current statutory definition of 
rape stands “they cannot give complainants the complete assurance that they will not [be] 
subjected in court to humiliating or intimidating questions about their sexual history.”153So on 
the one hand, in parliamentary debates the belief in consent is referred to as a “ridiculous 
defence”154 and yet this gateway freely allows in this evidence. A good example of the effect 
this could have can be found within one parliamentary debate. Vera Baird commented; “I had 
a conversation with a famous female broadcaster – almost a household name – and the 
director of a prominent female equality lobby group. We three, confident middle-class 
woman, decided that, if we were raped by someone we knew, we would be unlikely to report 
it. Now that I have read the inspector’s report and the case of the Crown v A, it seems even 
less likely that any of us would report the offence.”155 
 
3.6.3.2 McEwan says that “on one view, whenever consent is an issue in a sexual case, it is 
accompanied by that of belief in consent.”156 Because the defendant is unlikely to allege that 
the complainant consented to intercourse while also stating that he thought she did not.157 
McEwan says that because the prosecution must prove all elements of the offence, it is 
misleading to describe the denial of mens rea as a defence.158 She references the case of R 
v Morgan in which Lord Hailsham says; “Once one has accepted...that the prohibited act in 
rape is non-consensual sexual intercourse, and that the guilty state of mind is an intention to 
commit, it seems to me to follow as a matter of inexorable logic that there is no room either 
for a ‘defence’ of honest belief or mistake, or a defence of honest reasonable belief or 
mistake. Either the prosecution proves that the accused had the required intent, or does 
not.”159 In reality the defendant’s belief in consent, with the issue of consent itself, stands or 
falls with the plausibility of his version of events. And she notes that the evidence for consent 
                                                152 Op. cit 122 at p 227  
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will likely also be the evidence on which belief in consent is also based and therefore a 
separate defence of mistaken belief is “necessary only where it rests of different evidence 
from that which suggests actual consent.”160 
 
3.6.3.3 In Davies,161 in accordance with the decision in R v RT; R v RH162 that a 
complainant’s statements about her sexual history fall outside s.41, it was accepted that she 
could be cross-examined about telling the defendant she had previously slept with two other 
men. The Court of Appeal also took into account the defence argument that whether or not 
the statement was true, was crucial because “if it were true, it was more likely that she had 
indeed told him this, and if so, that would be relevant to his belief in consent.”163 However, it 
was held that examination could go no further than asking for confirmation that she had slept 
with two men. McEwan comments that even this level of detail ‘is likely to have a serious 
effect on juror perception of the complainant’s credibility, it is reassuring to find the Court of 
Appeal more recently in R v W taking the view that R v RT; R v RH applies only to allegedly 
false complaints in the past. Cross-examination for other reasons on a complainant’s 
statement to the accused about sexual experience invokes s.41.164  Kibble uses four rape 
case scenarios in order to analyse judicial perspectives on the operation of s. 41. A 
discussion of this study can be found in chapter 4. 
 
3.6.4 Denial, by the Defendant, of the Sexual Acts 
3.6.4.1 Secondly the denial of sexual acts exists for situations the defendant denies sexual 
intercourse even took place. It would allow him to present evidence to show that sexual 
relations did not take place. The problem I can see with this type of evidence is that 
evidence which is from the occasion in question would be allowed anyway as each side has 
the right to present the facts as they see them. Therefore this would seem to be sacrificing 
more ground to the defendant at the expense of the complainant’s privacy.  
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3.6.5 Motive to Lie 
3.6.5.1 Thirdly Temkin suggests that evidence of the complainant’s motive to lie could be 
brought in through this exception. Birch gives the example of the woman scorned.165 The 
type of evidence this exception refers to is where her previous sexual behaviour could show 
that she might lie or that she has lied in the past. So for example, it could be that she has a 
history of reporting rape. Interestingly this type of evidence would not be allowed in the 
Canadian or Michigan systems which the UK is often compared to and would only be 
allowed in a limited fashion in New South Wales. Whilst I can see that where a woman has a 
history of such lies it may be useful for the jury to know in order to prevent a wrongful 
conviction, there does need to be careful consideration of such matters because the 
prejudicial value of such evidence will almost certainly turn the jury against the complainant. 
It is concerning that there seems to exist some unwritten rule that a woman can only ever 
claim rape once in a lifetime and that any subsequent rape allegation is automatically 
considered false. It also seems odd that the UK is choosing to ignore the experiences of 
other countries. For this reason it is good that there are additional hurdles for evidence to 
overcome before it can be admitted. (More information on the additional hurdles can be 
found later in this chapter at para 3.7) 
 
3.6.5.2 One of Kibble’s four scenarios166 is a case in which the 14 year old victim could be 
said to have a motive to fabricate. It involves a 14 year old girl who tells her teacher that her 
stepfather had raped her. He however, claims there was no sexual contact at all and in fact 
that he believes that the complainant has made such accusations because he had 
discovered her having sex with her boyfriend a few days before and had forbidden them to 
see each other again. In his study he shows that the “judges were almost unanimous in 
deciding that leave should be given to allow cross-examination of the complainant in relation 
to the defendant’s discovery of her having sexual intercourse with her boyfriend.”167 One 
reason given is that it “goes to a central issue, her credibility, on the basis that he is alleging 
a) she has made up the allegation and b) that she has specific motive to make up her 
allegation and if there is any evidence of such a motive, then it ought to be before the jury” 
                                                
165 Birch, Di, pp.550-1.Cm 5668(2002) 
166 Kibble, Neil,  ‘Judicial Perspectives on the operation of Section 41 and the relevance and 
admissibility of  prior sexual history evidence: four scenarios: Part 1’ (2005) Crim LR 190 at p 203 167 Ibid at p 193 
 
 
40 
 
because it would be “manifestly unfair in my view to deny him the opportunity to present 
evidence of a motive where that would affect the jury’s consideration of her 
credibility.”168However, the judges also agreed that there need be no questioning as to the 
details of the sexual intercourse itself. The judge needs to point out that it gives a motive to 
lie as opposed to “dwell on what they were doing or how often they’ve done it or anything 
else.”169 A very worrying comment that was recorded during the analysis of this scenario was 
a suggestion that the judge decides whether or not he wants to admit the evidence and then 
simply finds a way to get it in through s.41. He says “I must say I find Section 41 very difficult 
and I must confess I am inclined to look at the thing and decide what’s fair then see how I 
can get it in. Because in a sense it does impugn her credibility but then that’s what fighting 
cases is all about.”170 Kibble points out that many of the judges seemed to think S.41(4) was 
only “intended to eliminate a generalised attack on the credibility of the complainant. One 
said: ‘In our scenario, it is her credibility in the allegation she makes which is an issue and 
which the defence say goes directly to a motive to lie on her part. Plainly that’s an attack on 
her credibility but an entirely understandable and proper one because it is relevant to a 
specific factual issue. It’s not just a general attack to discredit her in general terms; it’s an 
attack on her credibility on something specific, her motive for making an allegation.’”171 
Basically, as long as there’s another purpose, aside from impugning her credibility, it is seen 
as acceptable. There were a few judges who thought that evidence was relevant but felt that 
s 41(4) restricted them.  
 
3.6.5.3 In the case of R v AM172 questioning was initially not allowed on the issue of a 
previous allegation of rape. However, on appeal it was held that judge had erred in his 
decision because “the judge had not asked himself whether the jury could have been 
satisfied whether on the basis of the evidence that her previous allegation of rape had been 
untrue.” It was alleged that the initial complaint had been made so that the complainant could 
be re-housed. Therefore the conviction was ruled unsafe. The problem with the verdict in this 
case is that it could offer women yet another reason not to report rape because any 
complaint which is not followed through is viewed as suspicious.  
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3.6.6 Consent is Not the Issue 
3.6.6.1 Finally Temkin suggests a fourth, general area of evidence which could come under 
this gateway and that is simply situations where consent is not the issue. This seems 
extremely reminiscent of a catch all. However she does suggest that perhaps this could 
cover situations where the defendant wishes to prove for example that the complainant has 
gained knowledge of sexual behaviour from men other than himself.173 This could readily 
apply in situations where the complainant asserts that she was a virgin before the alleged 
rape. In such cases she may use sexual language or describe sexual acts when she gives 
her evidence and the defendant might want to try and suggest that she learnt such language 
or acts from other occasions and partners. Temkin does say that “great care is clearly 
required before such evidence is admitted.”174 however whilst this statement is very true, 
there are no guidelines to help enforce this in the legislation and so this is clearly another 
failing of this gateway. Lindsay Armstrong was raped at 16 years old.175 She gave evidence 
at the trial and later committed suicide. In court she was asked to hold up her underwear and 
read the words written on them. The defence said they simply wanted to show that her 
knickers had not been torn. However if this were the case then what exactly was the purpose 
of asking her to read what was written on them. Her parents believe that it was brought up 
so that the jury would make assumptions about Lindsay, who, they maintain, was a virgin. 
Kibble raises a scenario connected to this whereby the defendant wishes to cross examine 
the 11 year old complainant to explain the knowledge she has of sexual matters. Lord Hope 
in R v A gave this as one example where the issue is not one of consent176.  
 
3.6.7 ‘At or About the Same Time’ 
3.6.7.1 S.41(3)(c)(ii) refers to “any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which 
(according to such evidence) took place at or about the same time as that event, that the 
similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence.” 
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176 Op. cit 166 
 
 
 
42 
 
Sexual behaviour is defined in S.42(1)(c) as “any sexual behaviour or other sexual 
experience, whether or not involving any accused or other person, but excluding (except in 
section 41(3)(c)(i) and (5)(a)) anything alleged to have taken place as part of the event which 
is the subject matter of the charge against the accused.” In R v AM177 on appeal “sexual 
behaviour” was interpreted very broadly and a previous complaint of rape was taken to be 
included within the meaning. This seems exceptionally broad when a woman reporting rape 
can be considered “sexual”.  
 
3.6.7.2 Found in S.41(3)(b) this gateway is a logical addition to S.41 in many ways. If the 
evidence in question took place at the same time as the alleged rape then it goes to the 
central set of facts. This type of evidence must automatically be included because each side 
has the right to present the facts as they see them. Birch is pleased that “S. 41 does not set 
out to threaten the principle, recently and rightly identified by the law commission as 
fundamental to a fair trial, that both sides should be free to tender evidence bearing on the 
‘central set of facts’ in issue in the case.”178 She sees these as “obviously relevant facts.”179 
In that regard is there a specific need for this gateway if the evidence is of a type that should 
be admitted anyway on a general reading of the facts? And if the answer is no, that we don’t 
need a specific gateway then it may actually be damaging to add one in as it give the illusion 
of a liberal stance on sexual history evidence.  
 
3.6.7.3 During parliamentary debate the issue was raised as to whether such a gateway was 
actually required. There could be a situation where the evidence to which the gateway is 
referring to could have happened at or about the same time but not involving the defendant. 
In which case this is not general facts of the case. However, the debate only briefly touches 
on this because they were not given an “example of behaviour with anyone other than the 
complainant which would be relevant to consent.”180 What was really needed from the 
debate and was not given was clarity as to what ‘at or about the same time’ actually means. 
After all, if it is possible it could have involved a man other than the defendant this will likely 
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have been a different “event”. R v Mukadi181involved an incident earlier on in the evening 
where the complainant had got into a car with another man. Because that had happened on 
the same evening it was deemed to be relevant. In R v A Lord Slynn backs this up saying 
that he had imagine it to be a wide meaning “certainly a few hours, perhaps a few days if the 
couple were continuously together”182 though once again this refers to the defendant and not 
other men. It seems that given the decision in R v Mukadi  that “at or about the same time” 
has been interpreted as the same day. 
 
3.6.7.4 Interestingly though, when put together with the phrase “took place as part of the 
event” the definition does become narrower. It has been suggested to me that if the word 
“event” was replaced with the word “act” then the definition would be narrower still. However, 
is it the case that this loose nature of interpretation was desired? It seems that these two 
provisions; “at or about the same time” and “took place as part of the event” mean to be quite 
restrictive. And whilst “at or about the same time” could possibly be extended to third parties, 
it is difficult to see how; unless there was a third party actually present during the alleged 
incident that ‘took place as part of the event’ could be extended past the defendant. “The 
event” may sound less restrictive than “the act” but the intention behind it seems the same.  
 
 
3.6.8  So Similar it Cannot Reasonably be Explained as a Coincidence 
 
3.6.8.1 S.41(3) (c) states that it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the 
complainant to which the evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any 
respect, so similar— 
(i)to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence adduced or to be 
adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event which is the subject 
matter of the charge against the accused, or 
(ii)to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such evidence) took 
place at or about the same time as that event, 
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that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
 
3.6.8.2 The section above was not part of the original bill but was added to S.41(3)(c) in 
response to criticism in the House of Lords.183 It was the Heilbron report that initially 
suggested a “strikingly similar” format and therefore, considering one of the suggestions put 
forward in the Speaking up for Justice report was that the new legislation should return to the 
principles set out in Heilbron, this seems like a very sensible gateway to include. However 
one must wonder why, when the report has already pointed out the use Heilbron’s 
conclusions are, they did not simply chose to adopt the “strikingly similar” wording. However, 
in practice this could work just as well, or possibly better with the caveat that it cannot be 
reasonably explained as a coincidence. It certainly helps to fulfil the aim to clarify the law by 
adding this caveat and one would hope that the clearer the legislation is, the easier it will be 
to interpret in court.  
 
3.6.8.3 The idea of this type of exception, being based on similarity, was “firmly rejected in 
New South Wales, where it was pointed out that there would be difficulties in determining 
when a similarity in the sexual context was sufficiently striking.”184 Although this is an 
obvious issue that the courts will come up against with a provision like this, it was a strong 
recommendation in the Heilbron report and it seems like a sensible exception to the rules 
against admitting sexual history evidence. Whilst similar facts should not be taken as 
definitive evidence either way, similar instances in the past can help put the facts in context. 
This will mean less reliance on assumptions of sexual norms. Kibble raises a scenario 
involving an alleged rape by several defendants. A discussion of this scenario can be found 
in chapter 4. 
 
3.6.8.4 In 2009 the case of R v Harris185came before the court in which “similarity” evidence 
was disallowed at trial in accordance with S.41. The defence wished to use documents that 
had been disclosed from her psychiatric and medical records showing a history of 
depressive episodes in which she put herself as risk of abuse from others. It was stated that 
                                                
183 H.L.Deb., vol.597, col.45 (Feb 8, 1999) 
184 Op. cit 116 at p 229 
185 [2009] EWCA Crim 434; [2010] Crim LR 54 (CA (Crim Div)) 
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she engaged in excessive alcohol intake and casual sex during these episodes. The 
argument from the defence was that, this incident had been one such episode where she put 
herself in a risky sexual encounter. The judge refused the application and the appeal was 
also rejected. Kibble comments that “while difficult to disagree with the court’s decision that 
the trial judge’s refusal of the application to cross-examine the complainant ‘was open to him 
within the margin of judgment open to a decision maker’ the refusal nevertheless appears 
somewhat harsh.”186 He goes on to say that most of the cases in this area seem only to have 
“underlined the awkwardness of the provision.”187 In particular the case of R v T188which 
involved prior incidents of sexual activity in the same place, with the same person and the 
same sexual acts as well as other similar incidents and yet the evidence was not allowed in 
due to it not being sufficiently contemporaneous. On the one hand, it is good that the judges 
are restricting certain aspects of sexual history evidence as that is what the legislation 
intended to do, however, what is less satisfactory is the lack of clarity judges and 
commentators see with the legislation.  
 
3.6.9 Rebuttal 
3.6.9.1 Section S.41(5) applies if the evidence or question— 
(a)relates to any evidence adduced by the prosecution about any sexual behaviour of the 
complainant; and 
(b)in the opinion of the court, would go no further than is necessary to enable the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution to be rebutted or explained by or on behalf of the accused. 
S.41(5) allows the defence to challenge any evidence brought by the prosecution about the 
complainant’s sexual behaviour. Their questioning “must go no farther than is necessary to 
enable the evidence adduced by the prosecution to be rebutted or explained” and it should 
“relate to a specific instance or instances of alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the 
complainant.”189 Despite these obvious restrictions Temkin says that S.41(5) has “the 
                                                
186 Kibble, Neil, ‘R v Harris: Case Comment.’ (2010) Crim LR 54 at p 58 187 Ibid 188 [2004] EWCA Crim 1220; [2004] 2 Cr App R 32 189 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act S.41(5) and (6) 
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potential to be very broadly interpreted.”190 For this reason the unsafe test in S.41(2)(b) will 
become an important safeguard. 
 
3.6.9.2 The case of R v Humadi191involved a statement from the complainant that she would 
never have had sex with a stranger, or in fact, anyone but her partner. The defence wished 
to bring evidence in that she had, whilst being with her partner, been sexually active on a 
number of occasions with another man. The application was refused on the grounds that it 
carried no probative value and would “drive a coach and horses” through S.41.192 Once 
again, we can see evidence of judges trying to use S.41 to keep sexual history evidence out 
of trials which is definitely a good sign. The appeal was also dismissed. Kibble states that 
this decision was correct given that the evidence did not rebut her actual statement.193 She 
had said she would not have engaged in sexual intercourse with a stranger and the evidence 
the defence wanted to introduce was with a friend. What appears to be at work here is a very 
careful consideration by the courts as to whether or not the evidence in question genuinely 
rebuts her statement or whether or not it would simply cast doubt on her character. This 
shows that S.41 is at least causing judges to think more carefully before allowing evidence 
in. 
 
3.6.9.3 This gateway makes sense because it abides by general evidence law and the 
defence would usually be able to counter evidence which the prosecution put forward, 
regardless of the type of case in question. Birch makes a point that S. 41 is unusual in that it 
“provides a one-sided exclusionary rule affecting only defence evidence and questioning.”194 
In this respect however, it remains a two-sided affair. It would be difficult to argue against the 
implementation of such a gateway.  
 
 
3.7 Additional Hurdles 
 
                                                
190 Op. cit 116 at p 229 
191 [2007] EWCA Crim 3048 (CA (Crim Div)) 192 Ibid and referenced in Kibble, Neil ‘Case Comment’ (2010) Crim LR 54 193 Kibble, Neil ‘Case Comment’ (2010) Crim LR 54 
194 Op. cit 178 
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3.7.1 Introduction 
In addition to coming under one of these gateways evidence also needs to overcome several 
other hurdles before it can be admitted. The hurdles are; that refusing to give such evidence 
could lead the jury to an unsafe conclusion, that the main purpose of the evidence must not 
be to undermine the victim’s credibility, and that the evidence must relate to specific 
instances of sexual behaviour of the complainant. These are analysed separately below.  
 
3.7.2 To Prevent an Unsafe Conviction 
3.7.2.1 S.41(2)(b) states that that a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe 
a conclusion of the jury or (as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case. 
 
3.7.2.2 In the case of R v R195the appeal against the conviction was allowed on the grounds 
that “pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(2)(b) , evidence 
was admissible and cross examination permissible in relation to the alleged incident prior to 
the alleged offence because it was relevant to the issue of consent.”196This was because “if it 
was the case that the complainant had had consensual sexual intercourse with first R and 
then H, then a jury might take the view that her behaviour was so similar to the alleged rape 
that it could not reasonably be explained as a coincidence. Both the alleged rape and the 
previous incident were alleged to have taken place at R's home. The evidence of the 
previous sexual relationship and of the alleged post rape sexual relationship was so relevant 
to the issue of consent that its exclusion deprived R of a fair trial.”197  
 
3.7.3 That the Main Purpose of the Evidence is not to Undermine the Victim’s Credibility 
3.7.3.1 S.41 (4) states that f or the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence or question shall 
be regarded as relating to a relevant issue in the case if it appears to the court to be 
reasonable to assume that the purpose (or main purpose) for which it would be adduced or 
asked is to establish or elicit material for impugning the credibility of the complainant as a 
witness. 
                                                
195 [2003] EWCA Crim 2754 196 Ibid 197 [2003] EWCA Crim 2754 
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3.56 This is very difficult to judge because it will likely always be a purpose or a side effect 
of introducing the evidence. So how can you tell what the main purpose is? One can always 
just argue it wasn’t the main purpose, merely a side effect. The then Lord Chief Justice, Lord 
Woolf himself made a comment that the “language of s.41(3)(a) could be used to ride a 
coach and horses through the desirable policy reflected in section 41(4)”198 because it 
creates a back door for such evidence. In R v Martin,199 Mr Justice Crane pointed out that 
although it could be one purpose to impugn her, it was not necessarily the main or only 
purpose and of this specific case he said the evidence was not “questions which went solely 
to the question of credibility.” Importantly, as the case of R v Winter200 points out, another 
thing to consider is whether or not disallowing the evidence will create the risk of an unfair 
trial. In this particular case, it was decided that leaving the evidence out had not deprived the 
defendant of a fair trial and therefore the decision was upheld.  
 
3.7.4  The Evidence Must Relate to a Specific Instance or Specific Instances 
3.7.4.1 S.41(6) states that for the purposes of subsections (3) and (5) the evidence or 
question must relate to a specific instance (or specific instances) of alleged sexual behaviour 
on the part of the complainant (and accordingly nothing in those subsections is capable of 
applying in relation to the evidence or question to the extent that it does not so relate). See 
chapter 4 (para 4.6.4) for a discussion of how this gateway could operate. 
 
3.8 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25 
 
3.8.1 Without looking at this case and its effects it would be impossible for us to assess the 
success of S. 41. It was the first major case to be decided under the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA) and also involved the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). 
The judgment in the House of Lords unanimously upheld a challenge by the defendant, 
arguing that Section 41 and the inadmissibility of sexual history evidence with the 
complainant was a breach of his right to fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention 
                                                
198 R v Mokrecovas [2001] EWCA Crim 1644 199 [2004] EWCA Crim 916 200 [2008] EWCA Crim 3 
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on Human Rights (ECHR). The evidence he wished to use did not come under one of the 
four gateways provided for in S.41 and so instead suffered the effects of the blanket ban on 
sexual history evidence. (That is, the evidence was ruled not to be an issue relating to 
consent,201 to have happened “at or about the same time,”202 or to be such similar behaviour 
“that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence.”203 The Law Lords 
considered that to follow the Act exactly as it was drafted would be a breach of the 
defendant’s right to fair trial as it would not allow him to bring evidence they felt relevant. 
They used Section 3 HRA to read Section 41 in a way they felt was compatible with the 
ECHR, reintroducing a discretionary element204 back into the test of admissibility and thus 
seriously undermining the 1999 Act.  
3.8.2 At the preliminary hearing on December 8th 2000 the trial judge was asked to rule on 
the matter of cross examining the complainant under Section 41 Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA). He ruled that whilst the complainant could be questioned about 
any sexual activity in the last few hours with the defendant and also any other sexual activity 
at or about the same time, she could not be questioned about the previous relationship with 
the defendant under Section 41 (3)(b) or (3)(c). Since the last occasion on which the 
defendant and the complainant last engaged in sexual intercourse was over a week ago it 
did not qualify under the “at or about the same time” definition. However, he also said that 
prima facie this ruling would result in a breach of Article 6 (Right to fair trial) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights as implemented under the Human Rights Act 1998. As such, 
he was given leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. At which stage Rose LJ said the 
evidence of sexual activity with the defendant was admissible under Section 41 (3)(a) 
YJCEA 1999 as it went to the defendant’s belief in consent. Posing the following question 
the Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords; “May a sexual 
relationship between a defendant and complainant be relevant to the issue of consent so as 
to render its exclusion under section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
a contravention of the defendant’s right to fair trial?” 
                                                
201 S.41(3)(a) 202 S.41(3)(b) 203 S.41(3)(c)(i) and (ii) 204 This test of admissibility, expressed by Lord Steyn at para 46 is ‘whether the evidence (and 
questioning in relation to it) is nevertheless so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would 
endanger the fairness of the trial under Article 6 of the convention. If this test is satisfied the evidence 
should not be excluded. 
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3.8.3 The defence wanted the House of Lords to read Section 41 in such a way as to be in 
accordance with Section 3 HRA 1998 to allow compatibility with Article 6 of the convention 
and if this was not possible to make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4 HRA. 
The law lords were set the task of answering this question and being able to read the 
legislation in a way that was compatible with the right to fair trial. In doing so they went 
against the legislation; they gave back judicial discretion so that when it comes to sexual 
history evidence “where the line is to be drawn must be left to the judgment of the trial 
judges.”205 This was because they foresaw situations where to exclude the evidence would 
be a contravention of the defendant’s right to fair trial. Lord Steyn went so far as to say that it 
was “a matter of common sense” that prior sexual relations between the defendant and the 
claimant could be relevant.206  Lord Slynn took this one step further and demonstrated the 
effect this negative stereotype has had upon society by arguing that the “man or woman in 
the street would find it strange that evidence that two young people who had lived together 
or regularly as part of a happy relationship had had sexual acts together, must be wholly 
excluded on the issue of consent unless it is immediately contemporaneous.”207  
3.8.4 The fact that the Law Lords have once again made the distinction between sexual 
history evidence with the defendant and with third parties has highlighted the idea of “real 
rape”. That is to say that there is a distinction made between stranger rape, where the 
defendant is unknown to the complainant, and rape where the defendant is known to the 
complainant. There can also be a reference to violence made in the stereotype of “real rape” 
in that the idea often conjures up a dark alley where the victim is held at knife point. In fact, 
most rape is not stranger rape and therefore the idea of “real rape” is a damaging 
stereotype. There appears to be general satisfaction with the legislation’s interaction with 
third parties. The main area of discontent is how the legislation treats evidence with the 
defendant. The Lords dismissed the appeal saying that S. 41(3)(c) YJCEA 1999 should be 
interpreted under S.3 of the HRA 1998. They answered the question posed by saying that 
evidence of the complainant’s sexual history would be admissible where it was so relevant to 
the issue of consent that to exclude it would be to render the trial unfair. They deemed this to 
be a matter for the trial judge to determine. 
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3.8.5 R v A therefore, renders Section 41 somewhat obsolete because even where 
evidence does not fit under one of the four gateways the judge can decide, if it is in fact so 
relevant that it can be allowed anyway. McGlynn argues that section 41 had the intention to 
“restrict the use of sexual history evidence and, in doing so, to provide a structured approach 
to determining the situations in which it may be permitted.”208 Therefore by placing a 
discretion back into the legislation the Lords have gone directly against parliament’s aims 
and the whole ethos of the act itself which is meant to encourage more women to report and 
take rape claims into court without the fear of being subjected to the unnecessary use of 
their sexual history evidence as a means to discredit them and thus make them appear an 
unreliable witness. And so whilst section 41 was once a very clear and specific piece of 
legislation after this case it will “likely engender a degree of uncertainty.”209 However, this 
seems to have been the intention entirely. As Kibble says “there was a substantial 
consensus among the judges that S.41 was not a workable section prior to the decision of 
the House of Lords in R v A (No 2), which restored a measure of judicial discretion in relation 
to the consent gateways and particularly s.41(3)(c).”210  
 
3.8.6 The problem therefore, when judging the success of S.41 is that the current state of 
the law now links the legislation inextricably to this case. The two positions, the R v A stance 
and the initial wording of S.41, do not fit together comfortably yet it could be said that the 
original standpoint of the Act no longer exists as the case law, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, has developed following R v A. And whilst Kibble has suggested that many feel this 
to be a good thing due to the “unworkable”211 former nature of the legislation, it does not 
change the fact that any critique produced now, of the current state of the law cannot solely 
focus on the wording of S.41. Thus it makes it very hard for us to see where the problem lies 
in terms of the high use of sexual history evidence at trial. Is the initial legislation to blame, or 
is it the way in which R v A has adapted that legislation? 
 
                                                
208 Clare McGlynn Feminist Judgment of R v A [2001] UKHL 25 para 42, p 219 in Feminist Judgments: 
from theory to practice edited by Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley (Hart, 2010) 
209 Op. cit 116  at p 240 
210 Kibble, Neil, ‘Judicial Discretion and admissibility of prior sexual history evidence under Section 41 
of the YJCEA 1999: sometimes sticking to your guns mean shooting yourself in the foot: Part 2’ 
(2005) Crim LR 263 at p 264 211 Ibid 
 
 
52 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
3.9.1 Despite this controversial case, much of the criticism of the current law on sexual 
history evidence is directed to s.41 itself as opposed to its use in cases. Dennis says S.41 
“replaced former reliance on relevance and broad judicial discretion with tightly drawn 
categories of admissibility in an attempt to protect complainants from unwarranted intrusions 
into their privacy by harassment and humiliating questions.”212 Birch, who labels these 
measures “draconian”213 explains that the section “greatly restricts the use that defendants 
can make of evidence of complainants’ sexual history and in doing so creates serious 
problems for the fairness of trials.”214 This is because there is no overriding judicial discretion 
to allow evidence. Her damning critique of the legislation goes on to say that it “buries a 
number of untenable evaluative judgements about the relevance of sexual history evidence 
within one of the most elaborate formulae possible.”215 She highlights one of the main 
problems to be that judges have no “room to manoeuvre” and therefore “seek more radical 
solutions.”216 Dennis however, does not seem to be convinced by this argument and says, 
“the legislation is undoubtedly complex and difficult, but that is no excuse for some judges 
and barristers to have only a vague or non-existent grasp of it.”217 Whilst he may suggest the 
exceptions are narrow, Temkin actually feels they are wide enough to encompass a range of 
behaviour and are considerably broader than the exceptions in other jurisdictions.218 In light 
of R v A, Birch’s fears could in fact have been somewhat absolved. 
 
3.9.2 Firth references Nicholson219 and Young220 who are talking on a different matter but 
making a similar point that the judiciary jealously guard their discretion “through the 
admission of a test of relevance” to “maintain a strict control of the facts and themes 
summing up a case.”221 She says this will mean they can “manipulate the rules of 
                                                
212 Dennis, Ian, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Evaluating Section 41’ (2006) Crim LR 869 
213 Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531 at p 532 
214 Ibid at p 531  
215 Ibid at p 553 216 Ibid at p 551 217 Dennis, Ian, ‘Sexual History Evidence: Evaluating Section 41’ (2006) Crim LR 869 at page 870 218 Op. cit 116 at p 227 219 Nicholson, D, (1995) ‘Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered 
Women’, Feminist Legal Studies 3(2) 185 220 Young, A, (1996) ‘Femininity as Marginalia’ In McVeigh, Rush and Young (eds) Criminal Legal 
Practices, Open University Press, Oxford 221 Firth, Georgina, ‘The Rape Trial and Sexual History Evidence – R v A and the (Un)worthy 
Complainant’ (2006) NILQ [Vol. 57, No.3] p 454 
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admissibility and the discourses of consent to privilege a particular notion of 
(hetero)sexuality and to reward women who exhibit ‘approved characteristics’, for example 
those who are seen to be ‘respectable’, in this case meaning, sexually inexperienced and 
thus worthy of the law’s protection.”222Birch suggests that we need to look for ways to re-
educate the judiciary and common perceptions; to debunk rape myths within the trial process 
instead of excluding potentially relevant evidence. We need to “think of ways of taking the 
jury into the light rather than deliberately keeping them in the dark.”223 This argument can be 
extended to say that legislative reform was not necessarily what was needed but more a 
societal upheaval which changed the perceptions of rape in general and countered the 
myths. This however, is an extremely tall order. Purdom says this is because women do not 
have equal citizenship with men.224 In some ways I see this view as very extreme and not 
necessarily relevant to the fact that rape myths exist.  
 
3.9.3 Whilst the gateways do seem rather convoluted, I cannot agree with Birch to the 
extent to which she believes the gateways to be restrictive225 because as the chapter has 
shown, several of the gateways have a lot of room for interpretation. Instead I favour 
Temkin’s view226 that they are in fact wide enough. In fact considerably wider than in many 
other jurisdictions. And whilst I would not advocate an even more wordy piece of legislation 
there are certainly aspects of S.41 particularly after the impact of R v A which would benefit 
from further guidance, for example the ‘not an issue of consent’ gateway.   
 
3.9.4 Throughout the course of this chapter it has become obvious that there are still many 
problems with the way that sexual history evidence is handled in the courts and, more 
generally in society. To answer the question that this chapter set out to answer; “How 
successful has s.41 been?” there are various factors to take into account. The Act has been 
in use for over 10 years now and therefore we can expect that it will have had some tangible 
effect. Many of the cases pointed out in this chapter would suggest that it has in fact had 
                                                
222 Ibid and for a definition of ‘worthy’ she references S 2 SO(A)A 1976 and the Court of Appeals 
decision in R v Viola [1982] 1 WLR 1138 223 Birch, D, ‘Untangling Sexual History Evidence: a Rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ [2003] Crim LR 
370 224 Purdom, J (2000) ‘Judging Women: Rethinking Shame through Corporeality’ in Richardson, J & 
Sandland, R (eds) Feminist Perspective on Law and Theory, Cavendish Publishing, London at p. 209 225 She see the measures as ‘draconian’ and ‘greatly restrictive’, Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: 
Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531  226 See Temkin, Jennifer, ‘Sexual History Evidence – Beware the Backlash’ (2003) Crim LR 217 
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some effect and therefore has not been entirely unsuccessful. This having been said, as the 
Kibble study227 demonstrated, many of the judges have sometimes followed s.41 grudgingly 
even though they felt the evidence should have been allowed in. This will have a negative 
effect because it will encourage more appeals and shows that the judiciary have a lack of 
faith in the laws they are using which makes it less likely to gain public support. And whilst, 
some of the cases commented on in this chapter have followed s.41 and could be viewed as 
tangible aspects of its success, Kibble also comments that many judges do not know how to 
use it properly and of those who do, many would rather not.228 Whilst it was a tall order for 
the legislation to achieve, the best outcome of s.41 would have been that it began to change 
the perceptions which society have of a woman’s sexual history and how this reflects on her. 
This is not something that s.41 can currently claim to have achieved. 
 
3.9.5 As discussed earlier in the chapter, the success of s.41 in its original form is difficult 
to judge because of the almost immediate decision of R v A which greatly changed the way 
in which the section is now interpreted as it allowed back in a strong element of judicial 
discretion. And whilst in some cases the judges do not necessarily seem to abusing this 
discretion, it goes against the aim of the Act. The difficulty it causes in judging the success of 
the law on sexual history evidence is that the current stance is inextricably linked to the 
decision in this case and yet, it is the legislation, as interpreted which this thesis seeks to 
judge. The result of this is that critics may be crediting negative effects to the legislation itself 
when in fact, had this case not come about, or had it been judged differently, then s.41 may 
have been more successful. Of course this is something which cannot realistically be 
imagined or sensibly discussed and yet it is still a consideration. 
 
3.9.6 However, no matter whether or not the original wording of s.41, the judgment in R v A 
or, in fact societal views more broadly, are to blame;  the current stance and treatment of 
sexual history evidence is in need of reform because as this chapter has shown, the 
situation is uncertain. The action to be taken needs careful consideration and will be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter.  
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4. Assessing the successes of S.41 
4.1 Introduction 
 
4.1.1 The previous chapter analysed the provisions of S.41 in order to work toward 
answering the question of whether or not the legislation has been effective. The purpose of 
this chapter is to use the empirical studies which have been conducted in this area to assess 
the impact and success of s.41. One study in particular, a Home Office study; “Section 41: 
an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence in rape trial”, is focused 
specifically on this issue and seeks to “gauge to what extent this endeavour has been 
successful.”229 This chapter will address several issues, taking a thematic approach to the 
matters raised in these studies. It will first look at the scope of the legislation; the number of 
gateways and the issues which these cover. Secondly, it will look at the procedural criticisms 
surrounding S.41; asking the questions; how often is S.41 being used and it is being used 
properly? Thirdly it will consider the inconsistency with which S.41 has been applied, due in 
part to the lack of clarity of the legislation. As a final test to assess the success, or perhaps 
more likely, the affects of S.41 this chapter will look at the effect on conviction rates. This 
chapter will also take a brief look at the less tangible effects of the legislation because whilst 
conviction and attrition could be seen as a measurable effect there are other less tangible 
effects that we may hope to have seen following the implementation of S.41. Studies such as 
the work Temkin and Krahe compiled on attitudes of rape and Kibble’s study of judicial 
perspectives to assess the reactions to S.41 will be referenced here. 
 
4.2 Scope of the Legislation 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
 
4.2.1.1 This section will look at what recent studies have said about the legislation. By 
looking at this commentary on the scope of the legislation it will aid the chapter to access the 
success of S.41 as it will bring to light any issues. This will include any problems that the 
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reports detail about the lack of definition in the Act, the width of the gateways and whether or 
not the Act as a whole is too wide or narrow. Kibble offers more general comments on 
whether the Act went in the correct direction by using a non-discretionary regime. The most 
striking issue that seems to come out of these reports is the vast amount of sexual history 
evidence that is still allowed into trials. It has been suggested that there should be reiteration 
that this in fact a blanket ban and that “sexual behaviour evidence is not to be admitted by 
trial judges other than in the exceptional circumstances set out in the legislation.”230 
However, as the studies show, this may not be a scope issue but rather an implementation 
problem.  
4.2.2 Inclusion of the Prosecution 
 
4.2.2.1 A problem the Home Office raised with section 41 was the way that it only applied to 
defence counsel. They want the embargo to be applied to the prosecution as well “as is the 
case in some other jurisdiction.”231 This is a sensible suggestion because often the 
prosecution bring in evidence which then opens this evidence up to further questioning which 
may not be beneficial to the complainant.  
 
4.2.3 Is S.41 too Narrow? 
 
4.2.3.1 The Home Office report feels that the lack of room for evidence about sexual 
behaviour with the accused is a mistake and that a further gateway needs to be added.  The 
new gateway they suggest should “[allow] for evidence of previous or subsequent sexual 
behaviour with the accused” and they state that this exception could have a time limitation.232 
 
4.2.3.2 Temkin and Krahe comment that “many judges and barristers were critical of the 
general approach taken in section 41.”233 The main objection being that the “legislation was 
too limiting and that the circumstances in which sexual behaviour could be relevant could not 
                                                
230 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 at p VII 231 Ibid 232 Ibid 233 Temkin and Krahe, ‘Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude’ Hart Publishing 
(2008)at p 146 
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be predicted in advance by an Act of Parliament.”234So it is both narrow and unclear. It 
seems that where the judges felt the legislation was too narrow they simply reverted to their 
discretionary ways. The Home Office report details “six out of the 17 judges in this study 
were plainly undeterred and, regardless of the new legislation, were not prepared to forego 
their discretion in these matters.”235 
 
4.3 Lack of Clarity and Definition 
4.3.1 Specific Terms 
 
4.3.1.1 The Home Office report commissioned to review S.41 took issue with the “lack of 
definition”236within the section. For example the terms “sexual behaviour” and “sexual 
experience” because they cause uncertainty among practitioners as to the scope of section 
41.237 As one of their ideas for reform of the Act they suggest making both of these terms 
more defined. They also want to make it clear that the terms include “implied as well as 
express behaviour.”238 
 
4.3.2 The Focus of S.41 
 
4.3.2.1 A study was carried out in 2005 in Scotland on the law of evidence in sexual offence 
trials in order to assess the Scottish legislation. The Burman Report will be referenced 
throughout this chapter in order to provide further insight and a comparison to the stance in 
England and Wales. The Burman reports suggest they would like more emphasis put on why 
sexual history evidence is actually important. They say that the reasons for limiting the 
evidence is to “reduce the complainer’s ordeal of giving evidence in court,” but 
documentation of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 indicates that these rules 
alone are simply insufficient to protect the complainer from distress and humiliation.239 
Therefore in the same way that reports on s.41 say the legislation is inadequate the Scottish 
                                                
234 Ibid 235 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at p 53 236 Ibid 237 Ibid 238 Ibid 239 Burman, Jamieson, Nicholson, ‘The Law of Evidence in Sexual offence trials – Base Line Study’ 
(2005) at p 33 
 
 
58 
 
situation seems to be the same. The legislation was required but it does not go far enough to 
solve the problem of sexual history evidence. Burman concludes, “Whilst the reforms 
resulting from the 1995 Act were imperative, they nevertheless remain inadequate.”240 
Instead the report suggests that “real and marked changes in the prevalence of sexual 
assault and in the criminal justice response to such crimes may be dependent upon 
significant changes in social values and understandings of gender and sexuality.”241 
However, this creates a very difficult problem in terms of reform. Legislative reform can be 
difficult but if it is actually society and the attitudes they hold which are the problem, this is a 
much bigger issue because that type of change takes a much longer time to effect.  
 
4.3.2.2 Kibble goes further than most commentators in describing the problems of s.41. He 
says that non discretionary legislation is “fundamentally flawed.”242 Therefore it is not simply 
the wording of the legislation or its lack of focus on why sexual history evidence is actually 
relevant, but more the fact that it does not give judges enough power. He goes on to say that 
without R v A, Section 41 was unworkable.243 This is because R v A added an element of 
discretion back into s.41. He says that non-discretionary legislation “can only operate fairly 
once the appellate courts have intervened and restored judicial discretion.”244 
 
4.4 Procedural Criticisms 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
4.4.1.1 This thesis takes the view that procedural issues are the biggest failing of S.41 as 
they mean that the legislation is not being applied correctly and therefore it is difficult to truly 
assess the success of S.41. Only when the legislation is being followed correctly can we see 
if it is making a difference. As it stands, the misuse confused the picture and makes it difficult 
to comment on S.41 as a standalone rather than evaluating the situation as a whole.  
 
4.4.4.2 However, knowing how much s.41 is used is useful because it allows us to see if the 
legislation is being used properly and specifically which gateways are being used most. 
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Particularly the Home Office study which is focused solely on S.41 is very useful because it 
is rare for comprehensive studies to be carried out on new legislation only six years after it 
was enacted. 
 
4.4.2 Use of S.41 
 
4.4.2.1 The Home Office study carried out by Kelly et al showed that S.41 applications were 
made in around a quarter of rape cases.245 Considering that S.41 implements a blanket ban 
on the use of sexual history evidence this would seem to be a large proportion. Applications 
were allowed in just over two thirds of cases246 and yet sexual history was raised in more 
than ¾ of trials.247 This is because the proper procedure for applications is only used in a 
minority of cases, with most applications still being made at trial.248  
 
4.4.3 The Difficulties facing Assessment  
 
4.4.3.1 It is difficult to say which gateways are being used most often because “the limited 
data on the specific paragraphs of section 41 which are being used in applications suggest 
that many continue to be phrased in general terms, thus evading the purpose of the 
legislation, which was only to allow sexual history evidence in the circumstances specified in 
the Act.”249 This is problematic when trying to answer questions about the success of the 
legislation because to truly assess the effectiveness of the section, one would be able to say 
which gateways were used most often and which were used in the correct way whilst 
highlighting any abuses. 
 
4.4.4 Are the Procedures being Adhered to? 
 
                                                
245 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
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4.4.4.1 The previous chapter looked at the crown court rules which regulate the procedure of 
introducing sexual history evidence through s.41. However the basics of these regulations 
are fairly simple; applications are to be made in advance of the trial in written form detailing 
the questions to be asked. It is important to observe whether or not these are being followed 
as this will affect the judgment of whether s.41 has been successful. If research suggests 
that rules are being followed and yet the use of sexual history evidence is still high then the 
rules themselves may be at fault. However, as studies suggest, the procedures are not being 
followed. Therefore the question can be raised as to whether s.41 would be having more 
success if it were actually being adhered to correctly.  
 
4.4.4.2 As the most of the research in to the use of S.41 plainly states, the legislation is often 
being ignored and applications are often “made and decided with[out] proper reference to the 
legislation.”250 Or alternatively, an application may be made but the Home Office report gives 
an example of “two of the nine cases observed questioning [going] beyond the restrictions 
imposed” without challenge.251 This is either an example, of the judiciary turning a blind eye 
to the legislation or being unaware of its provisions. Sexual history of complainants was 
introduced in nine of the 23 full trials observed without any reference to section 41. This was 
the case in both trials involving current or ex-partners.252 Once again there is little evidence 
of judges preventing or intervening when this happens. 
4.4.5 Procedural Avoidance 
 
4.4.5.1 It would appear that even where critics do not take issue with the legislation they are 
however, often highly critical of the way in which the legislation is adhered to, or rather not 
adhered to. This is to say that the legislation itself may be correct, but that it is the 
implementation which is unsatisfactory. To illustrate Temkin and Krahe comment that “some 
judges” knowledge of the section 41 regime was vague.’253 The Home Office report says that 
                                                
250 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
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“Half of the judges interviewed were entirely unaware of [the crown court rules] or had no 
idea of their content.”254  
 
 
4.4.5.2 The Home Office report suggests that whilst S.41 may be being used, it is not being 
correctly adhered to. The proper procedures for applications, are set out in the Crown Court 
(Amendment) (No 2) Rules 2000, they were “used in a minority of cases, with most 
applications being made verbally at court.”255 The Act therefore, cannot be having the effect 
that was initially intended. It cannot be successful if it is not being used properly. The Home 
Office report showed that the Crown Court Rules were “frequently ignored or avoided, with 
the vast majority of applications being made at trial and presented verbally.”256 The problem 
with this is that it makes the specifics of s.41 easier to avoid. The report says that because 
the written applications have to be specific and detailed questions to be asked, when verbal 
applications are made, such formalities “could be more easily evaded.”257 For this reason 
verbal applications disadvantage the prosecution as it means that “counsel [has] minimal 
opportunity to consider the arguments in detail,” and less time to “consult with either the CPS 
or the complainant about possible objections.”258 Furthermore it seems that the timing of the 
defence’s verbal applications are often maliciously motivated. The report says they 
“appeared to time their applications to come just before or during cross examination to 
create the most pressure on the complainant.”259 This is in direct opposition to the purposes 
of the Act. The purpose of the Act was to limit the use of sexual history evidence which in 
turn was thought would make the trial less traumatic for the victim and therefore encourage 
more people to report. To make matters worse, the judges do not seem to be preventing this. 
The report noted that they either “failed to notice or failed to sanction the defence for their 
breach.”260 In the same way that applications were generally not carried out in the correct 
way, when agreements were made between the prosecution and defence, these too did not 
necessarily follow section 41.261 
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4.4.6 Applications made at Trial 
 
4.4.6.1 By reading the Home Office report’s recommendations it becomes apparent that the 
main problems they find are that the Crown Court Rules are not being followed and that 
“steps should be taken to ensure that [they] are observed,” that every application should be 
made in writing and that they should generally be made pre-trial.262 Those made at trial 
“should be accepted only if the defence can show that they were unaware of the information 
on which the application is based until trial” and even then they should be made in writing 
and the prosecution given time to consider the application and the judges should submit their 
reasons for allowing or disallowing, in writing.263Complainants should be made aware of 
what information is going to be brought on them so that they “know what was in store in any 
ensuing trial.”264 It seems that these provisions would be extremely useful given that “all the 
barristers save one admitted that, when defending, they would leave the application until the 
trial.”265 
 
4.4.7 Moving Forward 
 
4.4.7.1 The Consultation paper; “Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for 
Victims of Rape” aims to, “improve the outcome of rape cases through further strengthening 
the existing legal framework and improving our care for victims and witnesses,”266 which 
suggests that the existing framework is not particularly strong. This report also references 
the late applications “made by the defence for previous sexual history evidence to be 
admitted.” They argue that “such late applications frustrate the effectiveness of the 
legislation as victims are unprepared for such cross-examination and fail to give their best 
evidence.”267 
 
4.4.7.2 In the same way that the 2006 Home Office report shows a lack of adherence to the 
formal applications procedure required to admit sexual history evidence, so to, does the 
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Burman study in Scotland. “Sexual history or sexual character evidence of the type 
prohibited by the 1995 Act was introduced by the defence without an application to the court 
in half (9 out of 18) of the sample of High Court trials without an application which were 
scrutinised as part of the research.”268 This suggests that the situation in Scotland is similar 
to the situation with s.41. In the Scottish cases the prosecution and judiciary did not always 
prevent such evidence; the prosecution objected in 3 cases, all of which were upheld by the 
judge269 which is the entirety of the study, does not seem like a large enough number. Where 
an application had been partially successful and the defence strayed beyond what was 
agreed in the application, the judge intervened to remind the defence of the parameters in 2 
cases.270 In the same way that s.41 was needed and yet seems unsatisfactory, so too does 
the current Scottish restriction on sexual history evidence; “documentation of the 1995 Act 
indicates that the rules alone or their implementation are simply insufficient to protect the 
complainer from distress and humiliation.”271 
 
4.5 Inconsistency of application 
 
4.5.1 As this thesis has shown S.41 is not being correctly followed, due in large part to the 
lack of support from the judiciary, and is therefore having little success. The application of 
S.41 is inconsistent. Applications are being made during the trial, instead of pre-trial.  
Verbally instead of in writing and for evidence which is excluded under S.41. It is the 
judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that applications are made correctly in adherence to the 
proper procedures set out in S.41 and the crown court rules. This section will look at why the 
application has been inconsistent by looking at judges and barristers comments on the 
legislation. 
 
4.5.2 Kibble stated that the decision in R v A has made s.41 a workable provision, or at 
least, without that decision, the provision was unworkable.272 With one exceptions, all the 
judges familiar with the decision interpreted R v A to mean that they now had a very broad 
                                                
268 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
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residual discretion in order to ensure a fair trial under Article 6.273 However, this has 
essentially created a whole new gateway of discretion and completely gone against the 
ethos of s.41 as it was originally drafted.  So even if s.41 could now be said to be effective, if 
this is only because it has been re-interpreted by case law – is this actually the success of 
s.41? As it is, s.41 has not been deemed to be successful however it could be argued that it 
has never had the chance to work in its original form as the decision in R v A quickly 
changed it. 
 
4.5.3 The creation of sections 41-43 of the YJCEA 1999 “was an attempt to cut through the 
myths and stereotypes in order to produce fair outcomes in trials for sexual offences.”274 And 
the Home Office report seeks to “gauge to what extent this endeavour has been 
successful.”275It does this by examining case files, observing trials and conducting 
interviews; all of which suggest that “both prosecution and defence share stereotypical 
assumptions about ‘appropriate’ female behaviour and that these continue to play a part 
when issues of credibility are addressed in rape cases.”276This seems to reiterate the 
conclusions which were made in Burman that the legislation alone is “simply insufficient to 
protect the complainer from distress and humiliation.”277Interviews suggested that 
complainants themselves saw the “use of sexual history evidence in trials as unjust and an 
invasion of privacy.”278 
 
4.5.4 In the Home Office report Interviewees were asked for their general opinion of 
legislation. Most were in favour of it to a degree because they felt that insufficient control had 
been enforced in the past.279 A female judge said: “Well I would’ve said no it’s not a good 
idea, but I think it’s necessary, because too many judges have let in sexual history in the 
past...partly because they’re persuaded by the arguments and partly because they’re men. 
There you are, that’s not a very PC remark to make, but I think that we all tend to do that, we 
                                                
273 The Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
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say ‘There but for the grace of God go I,’ In this circumstance or the other.’”280But four of 
them said it was “unnecessary and was not a good idea” and another considered it an 
“impertinence” on the part of the legislature to intervene in this way.281 On the question of 
whether or not sexual history evidence is actually relevant “three judges (including both the 
female judges interviewed) considered that sexual behaviour evidence was very rarely of 
any relevance but the majority did not share this view.”282 
 
4.5.5   Many judges and some barristers were critical of the general approach taken in the 
new law.283  This was because they felt that it was too narrow and it was difficult to predict 
which bits of sexual history evidence would count as being relevant.284 Four judges regretted 
the lack of confidence in the judiciary which, in their view, had led to the legislation285 being 
so against judicial discretion. A few of the judges did welcome it for “providing a structure for 
decision-making and for demanding a rigorous scrutiny of the relevance of sexual history.”286  
 
4.5.6 Despite these opinions the report documents that some judges’ knowledge of the 
section 41 regime was vague.287 Several gave the lack of section 41 applications as their 
reason for this.288 A number commented that the drafting rendered the legislation hard to 
understand289 which is backed up in the report which believes terms like “sexual behaviour” 
are ill-defined. And yet, several comments were made about the actual differences between 
the old legislation in S.2 and S.41. One judge makes the comment that whilst he doesn’t 
think much has changed, “it has put people on the alert that previous sexual history is not 
automatically fair game, and that you’re going to need the judge’s leave to ask about it, and 
you’re going to have to have decent reasons before you get leave.”290  
 
4.5.7 The crucial case of R v A changed the way the legislation works and the Home Office 
report shows that “the judges who were familiar with the decision were unanimous in their 
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approval of it”291 and the way that it gives judicial discretion back to the judges. This basically 
means that in its original form the judges disapprove of S.41 because it removes discretion. 
Once again this relates back to what Kibble says about s.41 being “unworkable” before R v 
A.292  
 
4.5.8 Several barristers felt that section 41 was proving to be an effective instrument for 
controlling the flow of sexual behaviour evidence. Only one openly stated that it needed to 
be better enforced.293 One judge thought that if victims knew that they would not be 
subjected to unnecessary and unpleasant cross-examination, then not only would they be 
more likely to come forward to give evidence, but they would make better witnesses.294 This 
would fulfil some of the aims that s.41 initially set out to achieve. The fact that it does not 
seem to currently be fulfilling these aims means that s.41 cannot be deemed to be a 
success. And yet, “Judges and barristers were mainly in favour of legislation to control 
sexual history evidence as they considered that there had been abuses in the past and, 
without legislative intervention, such evidence would certainly be widely introduced.”295 The 
question however, is not whether legislation was needed, as most will agree it was. The 
question is whether or not this piece of legislation has been successful. And it would appear 
from everything that has been said in the reports discussed in this chapter that it has not. 
The judges seem to take the view that s.41 cannot be a success because the need “a 
residual discretion to allow in sexual history evidence where they considered it was fair to the 
defence to do so.”296 The Home Office report shows that “some operated as if section 41 did 
contain a discretion, [and] some were prepared to ignore the letter of the legislation and 
latched on to the decision in A, for which there was unanimous approval and which was 
interpreted as giving them a broad discretion.”297 
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4.6 Kibble’s Study 
 
4.6.1 In 2003 Kibble interviewed 70 circuit judges in England and Wales; 4 high court 
judges, 3 Lords Justices of Appeal and a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. They were asked to 
respond to four scenarios and also interviewed about the “structure and operation of s.41 
and about the judges perceptions of problems and issues in this area.”298 The scenarios 
included sexual history evidence with the defendant, of a minor, in a gang rape situation and 
a case involving medical evidence. This type of research is very important because the 
judiciary are the ones who use and interpret statutes and put them into action. Knowing how 
s.41 is being interpreted and whether or not the judges are using it in a way that remains 
faithful to the initial aims of the Act itself. He makes a case for judges acting in a far more 
“thoughtful and considered approach”299 to sexual history evidence than perhaps is often 
suggested however he does say that the judges are critical of the legislation but that this is 
to be expected given that it restricts their discretion. This is shown by one judges comment; 
“We would say that wouldn’t we” with regard to the legislation being constraining.300 
However, whilst Kibble argued their approach is thoughtful, upon studying the research 
findings it is also obvious that whilst the judges may consider the Act carefully, they often 
chose to disregard it because they feel evidence is still relevant.  
 
4.6.2 Judges took issue with S.42(4) as it seems to prevent any attack on the credibility of 
the complainant. One judge said;  
“I must say I find section 41 very difficult and I must confess I am inclined to look at 
the thing and decide what’s fair then see how I can get it in. Because in a sense it 
does impugn her credibility but then that’s what fighting cases is all about. I think 
what it’s getting at in a rather muddled way is it’s trying to prevent questioning that 
simply attacks the reputation of the witness – because she’s had sex, she lies, she’s 
that sort of girl. But it’s very difficult; the wording does make it very difficult.”301  
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As this quote shows, judges still want to make a decision themselves about whether the 
evidence in relevant, instead of looking to the Act to see what should be brought in. And 
whilst a certain degree of interpretation of the section can be expected, this would appear to 
suggest unnecessary manipulation of a kind which the legislation cannot have been aiming 
for. It seems there are two ways of dealing with the dissatisfaction judges appear to be 
feeling in reference to the restrictive nature of the Act. There are those who allow the 
evidence anyway as they feel it is relevant and there are those who want to allow the 
evidence but “feel obliged to exclude” it because of s.41(4).302 Neither of these is the ideal 
situation but perhaps, by employing the latter way of coping, the definition of “relevant 
evidence” in this context, will change over time.  
 
4.6.3 It would seem that in the same way the judges seem to take a view of what relevance 
should mean in this context, there is also a conceptualising of what types of sexual Act are 
normal and this effects what types of evidence the judges want to allow in. For example, 
Kibble presented the judges with a gang rape scenario and asked whether or not they would 
introduce evidence from three weeks earlier, in which the complainant, immediately after 
meeting men in a bar had suggested, whilst dancing with them, that they all go somewhere 
for drugs and some fun and had subsequently engaged in sexual intercourse with them.303 
Most of the judges concluded that questioning should be allowed because it is out of the 
ordinary. One judge said; “Having a group rape itself infers violence and no consent, but if 
this is a girl who is in the habit of chatting up groups of men and going off with them, well 
that sets it in a different context. It may still be rape, but it would be rather unfair not to tell 
the jury about that, I would have thought.”304 However it was commented that evidence about 
“picking up chaps in bars”305 probably wouldn’t be allowed in which suggests that certain 
aspects of sexual activity are deemed to be more perverse than others. One of the judges 
did however say that the complainant is “entitled to conduct herself generally as she 
wishes.”306 This is an admirable sentiment but she will still have to face the consequences of 
her actions as it is likely her sexual history evidence would be brought into court, particularly 
in a scenario like this. 
                                                302 Ibid 
303 Ibid at p 195 
304 Ibid at p 197 305 Ibid 306 Ibid at p 198 
 
 
69 
 
 
4.6.4 The hurdle found at S.41(6) states that evidence must relate to a specific instance or 
specific instances and could be seen as a way to limit the above issue from occurring 
however there is no further detail on the types of specific referred to. The scenario Kibble 
presents involving the 11 year old girl is given as an example where this particular hurdle will 
come into play. In this case some of the judges said it was not necessary for the defence to 
know when these instances occurred or with whom they had occurred with. However this 
seems to be very contradictory; what exactly are the specifics required? One judge suggests 
how this could be possible; “suppose the defence had medical evidence consistent with an 
act of intercourse or perhaps some other kind of penetration. I think that’s arguably a specific 
instance. Maybe you can’t say who it was or what it was, but you’re talking about an 
occurrence. I think I would approach it in that way. One can see how it could be a situation in 
which to shut this out would simply prevent a fair trial taking place.”307 
 
 
4.6.5 Several points were made in the research about the jury being entitled to know the 
full story so that they might make a proper decision. Particularly when this evidence relates 
to the defendant the judges thought that the jury should know the extent of their 
relationship.308 One judge who was very much in favour of this position stated; “I think it’s 
nonsensical to suggest that prior sexual history evidence with the defendant doesn’t go to 
consent, as the Lords in R v A said. I mean if you went out in the street and asked a hundred 
people they would say, of course it’s relevant. The people who say that none of this should 
ever be asked make a leap saying, ‘Oh, you’re saying that a woman can never say no.’ Well 
nobody is saying that it’s relevant to whether a woman did or didn’t say no.”309 But to counter 
this one judge said; “I can’t see how they are going to be assisted by either knowing or not 
knowing that on some previous occasion two weeks ago she happened to say yes.”310 This 
argument comes down to the central issue of what evidence is actually relevant and as 
many of the judges did actually emphasise in the study, consent on a previous occasion will 
not automatically mean consent in the case in question and whilst many judges said they 
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would give directions to that effect; that may not be enough to prevent the jury from 
prejudice. In another example, in a scenario involving a 14year old girl claiming her 
stepfather had raped her, the defendant argues that she is making this claim because he 
had found her having sex with her boyfriend and forbidden her to see him again. One judge 
said that it was not enough to ask juries to decide the outcome on the basis of an argument 
between the parties, leading the boyfriend to be banned from the house as this was “unreal 
and artificial” and the “jury would only be able to assess the plausibility of the defendant’s 
claim if they knew of the substance of the argument.”311 However, this argument can lead to 
a slippery slope of allowing in all evidence so that the jury can simply make up their own 
mind. This would not be appropriate given the prejudicial effects this evidence is known to 
create. It seems though, that the judges interviewed in the study were “sceptical of the 
argument that the inevitable consequence of allowing any questioning or evidence in relation 
to the prior incident would be to prejudice the jury against the complainant.”312 this may be 
because they think that warnings they themselves give the jury about not attaching too much 
weight to certain evidence is very effective but given the prevalence of rape myths as 
discussed earlier in this thesis, their argument seems to fail.  
 
4.6.6 Judges themselves seem highly convinced by arguments about sexual history 
evidence being relevant when it concerns the defendant. In the aforementioned scenario of 
the young girl who was caught having sex with her boyfriend the judges were “almost 
unanimous” in deciding to allow the evidence.313 Many of them said that this was because it 
went to the central issue in the case; “My reaction would be to allow the defence to question 
her about that incident because it goes directly to a central issue, her credibility, on the basis 
that he is alleging that a) she has made up the allegation and b) that she has specific motive 
to make up her allegation and if there is any evidence of such a motive, then it ought to be 
before the jury. It would be manifestly unfair in my view to deny him the opportunity to 
present evidence of a motive where that would affect the jury’s consideration of her 
credibility.”314 As with a lot of the statements made by judges throughout Kibble’s study, 
there is little reference to s.41 and instead they choose to make judgments based on their 
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own ideas of relevance. The study would suggest that some of the judges do exclude 
evidence; even where they feel is relevant. For instance in the scenario of the 14 year old girl 
and her stepfather several of the judges realised it would be excluded under s.41(4) but they 
expressed their views at disliking leaving this evidence out.315 However this was not a 
common theme throughout the research. It seemed more likely that a judge would let 
evidence in he technically knew should be disallowed rather than disallow on the grounds of 
s.41. 
 
4.6.7 Kibble appears to strongly defend the judges against the considerable criticism they 
have come under for their use of s.41. He has said he feels the research shows “judges are 
generally taking a more thoughtful and considered approach to the question of admissibility 
than is often suggested in the literature.”316 The judges however, are critical of s.41 because 
of its restrictive nature. The “consensus among the judges that s.41 was not a workable 
provisions prior to the decision of the House of Lords in R v A (No. 2), which restored a 
measure of judicial discretion in relation to the consent gateways and particularly 
s.41(3)(c).”317 He references the “determination” of judges to “avoid injustice” and yet at the 
same time the research must acknowledge the willingness of the judges to disregard the Act. 
To illustrate this one judge said “I’d be prepared to bend one or two things, on timing whether 
it’s contemporaneous, if it’s a few days rather than 24hours and that sort of thing”318 and 
went on to say that he must weigh up the fairness to both parties. Once again, while the 
sentiment is valid, the legislation is being ignored in favour of the judges’ own perspectives. 
This seems to be a common theme in getting around the Act. One judge commented that he 
had originally thought s.41 would make “life impossible...if a way wasn’t found around it.”319 
The majority of judges praised R v A  for making s.41 “workable.”320  
 
4.6.8 The conclusions therefore, which can be made from Kibble’s research suggest that 
whilst some of the judges may be working hard to ensure justice, many of them do so by 
disregarding s.41. They particularly criticise the legislation in its original form before R v A 
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interpreted back into it, a substantial amount of judicial discretion. This is significant in terms 
of answering whether or not s.41 has been successful because it gives us an insight into 
what the people actually using the legislation think about it and how they are using it. As 
much of the research looked at in the chapter has shown, it would seem that the proper 
procedures linked to s.41 are not being followed and therefore it cannot be said to have been 
successfully implemented. But at the same time, this piece of research, by Kibble, suggests 
that the reason it has not been implemented is because it was unworkable321 without 
additional judicial discretion. The overall judgement from the judiciary is a negative one.  
 
4.7 Effect on conviction rates 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
4.7.1.1 Whilst the number of rape convictions has remained relatively stable, the number of 
rapes reported to the police is increasing year on year; meaning that the proportion of rapes 
resulting in a conviction has steadily declined.322 The relationship between these two 
variables is highly complex and it cannot be said that encouraging women to report rape will 
automatically result in a rise in conviction rates. (For further discussion see para 5.1.1) 
National statistical data suggest section 41 has had no discernible effect on attrition, with the 
conviction rate for rape continuing to fall after its implementation.323 Since lowering attrition 
and increasing conviction were both aims of the legislation, the fact that no effect has been 
gauged is a rather damning indictment on the success of s.41. What is more “victims said 
that they weighed up the issue of whether sexual history evidence would be raised in court in 
deciding whether to report the matter to the police and subsequently in deciding whether to 
withdraw the allegation.”324 This suggests that the legislation has also been ineffective in 
changing people’s views and attitudes. It has not increased women’s confidence in the 
system. “Police Officers, SARC staff and support agencies all concur that sexual history 
                                                
321 Ibid 322 Office for Criminal Justice Reform; ‘Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims 
of Rape’ A consultation paper (2006) at p 8 323 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 
at p VII 324 Ibid 
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evidence plays a part in the decision-making of complainants, especially, but not exclusively, 
in the early stages.”325  
 
4.7.1.2   Ironically, the Home Office research study “A gap or a Chasm? Attrition in reported 
rape cases”, does not list the use of sexual history evidence at trial, as one of the reasons 
for the high attrition rate.326 This is contrary to the comments I have already referenced by 
the Home Office report which stated that victims “weighed up”327 that fact that their sexual 
history may be raised in court. Burman et al reported that whilst the effect of evidence on the 
outcome of trials is difficult to gauge, “it is very likely that a high rate of admission of such 
evidence is an important factor in the low conviction rate for rape and other serious sexual 
offences.”328 The report references US research which tends to show that “jury prejudice 
against the complainer is a consequence of the use of sexual history evidence.”329The report 
also backs up the claims that women are deterred from reporting by the possibility of having 
the sexual history brought into the court room.330 Whilst Temkin and Krahe do not 
necessarily reference the use of sexual history evidence as the reason for it, they do 
comment that studies show “most victims never report the matter at all”331 and say that one 
of the main reasons for this may be the “stereotypes at each stage of the process.”332 This 
can be linked in with the way sexual history evidence is used in court because it is often 
used to make the complainant look less credible so that they will not be believed by the jury.  
 
4.7.2 Can we rely on these figures as a marker for success? 
 
                                                
325 Ibid 
326 Home Office Research Study 293, ‘A Gap or a Chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases’ (2005) 
London 327 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history 
evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 
at p VII 328Burman, Jamieson, Nicholson, ‘The Law of Evidence in Sexual offence trials – Base Line Study’ 
(2005) at p 33 with reference to (e.g. Chambers and Millar, 1986; Lees, 1996; Lees & Gregory, 1993, 
1996; Temkin, 2000, 2002) 329 Burman, Jamieson, Nicholson, ‘The Law of Evidence in Sexual offence trials – Base Line Study’ 
(2005) at p 33 with reference to Kalven and Zeisel, 1966. 330 Burman, Jamieson, Nicholson, ‘The Law of Evidence in Sexual offence trials – Base Line Study’ 
(2005) at p 33 331 Temkin and Krahe, ‘Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude’ Hart Publishing 
(2008) at p 10 332 Ibid 
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4.7.2.1 Generally it would appear that the provisions are often ignored in favour of verbal 
applications made in court. Such applications are rarely objected to. As a consequence, the 
use of sexual history evidence is still very high. The attrition rate is still extremely high and 
the conviction rate very low. Therefore the tangible effects of S.41 are not being felt. 
However, as this chapter has shown, the correct procedures are not being adhered to and 
therefore it may not be the legislation itself that is at fault but rather the lack of 
implementation. As such it is difficult to judge the tangible effects that S.41 has had on the 
use of sexual history evidence. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
4.8.1 This chapter has focused on the empirical studies which have been carried out on 
sexual history evidence and s.41 in the last decade in order to further answer the question of 
how successful the legislation has been at combating the problems of sexual history 
evidence at trial. It is important that such studies have been carried out, specifically the 
Home Office report as such research is not carried out for every legislative reform. The fact 
that such studies have been conducted suggest that the government are well aware that this 
is a problem area for criminal law however the recent Stern Review which focused on rape 
all but disregarded sexual history evidence which somewhat suggests that evidential issues 
have been somewhat sidelined recently.  
 
4.8.2 The Home Office report documents that whilst S.41 applications are being made in 
some cases,333 in the vast majority, the evidence is simply being brought in at trial and not in 
accordance with the procedures which require written notice. This is evidence in the 
statistics which shows evidence being raised in three quarters of cases, whilst applications 
are only being made in one quarter.334  
 
                                                
333 In fact, the report documents that they are made in around 25% of cases. The Home Office report 
‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) 
London at p VI 
334 Kelly,  Temkin and Griffiths, ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting sexual 
history evidence in rape trials.’ Home Office Report 2006 
at p 47 
 
 
75 
 
4.8.3 The empirical studies seem fairly conclusive that section 41 has had little, if no 
tangible effect on the conviction rate or the use of sexual history evidence. In fact, the 
studies suggest the use of sexual history evidence is extremely high and the conviction rate 
has continued to fall. Ideas seem to differ as to whether or not this is the legislation itself that 
is the problem or whether it is the implementation of it. Given that the legislation is not being 
strictly adhered to, it would not be fair to automatically pronounce the legislation an entire 
failure. This issue will be considered in the next chapter which focuses on ideas for reform.  
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5. The future of S.41: Living with R v A 
5.1 Introduction 
5.1.1 Having looked at the background to the legislation on sexual history evidence over 
the last 30 years, this chapter will discuss the options for the future of s.41 and the regulation 
of sexual history evidence in the UK. It will discuss the various suggestions put down by 
academics as well as drawing on the examples of other jurisdictions’ provisions for 
inspiration as to how to solve the UK’s issues with sexual history evidence. It will look at 
ways that the legislation and the decision in R v A could be taken forward to improve on the 
current situation. It is important that the situation is improved upon because at the moment 
the conviction rate, which is around 6%335 is unacceptably low. The use of sexual history 
evidence may only be one factor in this, but everything that can be done to improve on it 
should be. By reducing the amount of sexual history evidence allowed into the court room, 
the reluctance some women may feel to report rape could subsequently be seen to diminish, 
and furthermore result in less defendants being acquitted. However, as previously mentioned 
in para 4.7.1.1, increased reporting will not automatically result in a higher conviction rate. In 
fact it may result, at least initially, in a reduced rate in terms of the proportion of convictions 
to reporting. This is because the way that these two variables (reporting and conviction) 
interact is highly complex. Given that the majority of rape cases do not fit the stereotype of 
“real rape” a change is also needed in the societal views on “acquaintance rape” otherwise 
juries will still be reluctant to convict thus resulting in an ever-reducing rate of conviction. 
 
5.1.2 The focus of the chapter is primarily on legislative enforcement, but the issue of 
judicial perceptions of sexual history evidence, and more general societal views, also play a 
large part in the potential success of the options. Therefore, whilst this chapter will 
recommend a way forward through working with the legislation to provide stronger 
procedural guidelines, there must be an acknowledgement that what is also required is a 
shift in societal views on women’s sexuality and sexual behaviour. This could mean that 
evidence brought in to allow the defendant a fair trial would not necessarily be prejudicial to 
                                                
335 There is a lot of controversy surrounding this figure. For example see ‘Rape conviction rate figures 
‘misleading’’, Tom Whitestead, 15 March 2010 http://www.londonbb.com/popups/popup_41.html 
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the complainant whereas, at present, because of the pre-existing stereotypes surrounding 
sexual history, when evidence is brought in it is almost certainly of significant detriment to 
the complainant.  
 
5.1.3 This chapter will suggest a combination of ways that the legislation can help the 
situation. It will analyse the various options that have been suggested by academics before 
concluding which of these options is likely to be more successful and why. Four main options 
will be discussed in this chapter. Firstly the possibility of adding further gateways to S.41. 
Propositions have been made for both a gateway incorporating evidence with the accused 
and for evidence with third parties. Secondly, a clarification of the current stance to provide a 
definitive set of guidelines for the future. Thirdly a thorough enforcement of the current rules 
to ensure that, going forward, for example, evidence will only be allowed in if it is permissible 
through the gateways and the request is made in accordance with the provisions set out. 
And finally the chapter will also set out the proposition that no action be taken at the present 
time. As the previous chapter described, this thesis takes the stance that the main failing of 
S.41 is the lack of enforcement and therefore it is enforcement that is required rather than a 
large legislative overhaul.  
 
5.2 Does S.41 Need Additional Gateways? 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
5.2.1.1 This thesis does not take the stance that s.41 is entirely unhelpful. Certainly there are 
many flaws to it; most worryingly its lack of clarity, but the ethos behind it, that is, limiting 
sexual history evidence, is essential and the gateways are a good way of preventing an 
unfair trial to the defendant. Therefore, the idea of abolishing S.41 will not be suggested 
here. However, the notion of adding in further gateways seems counter intuitive against the 
purpose of the Act itself. It is meant to be restrictive to sexual history evidence.  
 
5.2.1.2 Birch has suggested that s.41 could benefit from more gateways as she sees the 
current stance as “overly restrictive”336 because it was “not intended to encroach’”337 on the 
                                                
336 Birch, Di, ‘Untangling sexual history evidence: a rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ [2003] Crim LR 370 337 Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531 at p 532 
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right to fair trial. She sees limiting the use the defence can make of the complainant’s sexual 
history evidence as breaching the defendant’s right to fair trial. Therefore, it is not merely 
that she thinks further gateways would be helpful, more that the current gateways 
themselves are unhelpful as they themselves are too restrictive. In Birch’s eyes, perhaps, it 
is not a question of needing more gateways, but rather re-evaluating the effectiveness of 
such a categorised approach in the first place. However, this said, the purpose of section 41 
is to restrict sexual history evidence and without having certain categories of evidence being 
allowed as exceptions to that rule, no evidence would be allowed in. Therefore having 
gateways does seem like a good compromise to make as it aims to ensure a fair trial to both 
parties. For Birch, gateways can only be considered a good option for the future if more are 
created.  
 
5.2.1.3 In due course this chapter will lend itself to the discussion of the creation of additional 
gateways; regarding both evidence of sexual history evidence with the accused as well as 
with third parties. However, in the meantime it is worth noting that some of the evidence 
Birch wishes to include under these new gateways could potentially already be included 
under s.41. This is just one of the reasons this thesis will not put the idea of further gateways 
forward, for as stated by McGlynn “all substantially relevant sexual history evidence is 
capable of being accommodated within section 41’s four gateways.”338 I would tend to side 
with McGlynn here because it seems that the gateways of s.41 are, on the whole fairly 
generous. By creating more, one goes against the original model of the Act as a blanket ban 
on sexual history evidence. For example, Kibble has suggested that a gateway could be 
created for evidence related to “motive to fabricate” or “prior false allegations.”339However, 
such evidence if it overcame the relevance hurdles is included under s.41(1)(a) which deals 
with issues not relating to consent. It can also be noted that at the time of drafting the 
legislation, Parliament could have included further gateways or indeed, more judicial 
discretion but did not.340 The aim was to limit the amount of sexual history evidence. If further 
gateways are created they could result in s.41 being entirely pointless. 
                                                
338 McGlynn & Munro, ‘Rethinking Rape Law’(Routledge – Cavendish, 2010) p 209 339 Kibble, Neil, ‘Judicial Discretion and the admissibility of prior sexual history evidence under section 
41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: sometimes sticking to your guns means 
shooting yourself in the foot: Part 2.’ [2005] Crim LR 263 at p 274 340 For further discussion of this see McGlynn & Munro, ‘Rethinking Rape Law’(Routledge – 
Cavendish, 2010) p 219 
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5.2.1.4 In opposition to Birch, Temkin does not think that we need to add in any further 
gateways. In her opinion it is not as “draconian”341as might be portrayed by others and has 
sought to defend this approach in various articles. She acknowledges the legislation and 
moreover the current situation is not entirely flawless. For example the decision in R v A342”is 
likely to engender a degree of uncertainty”343 however, her criticism is more concerned with 
the enactment and clarity of the legislation rather than its content. This thesis is more likely 
to favour the approach of Temkin as it is reiterates the importance of the restriction of sexual 
history evidence and considers s.41 sufficiently generous in terms of how much evidence it 
allows in.  
 
5.2.2 A Gateway for Evidence of Sexual History with the Accused 
5.2.2.1 This is one of the most common suggestions amongst critics supporting the need for 
additional gateways. Papers have argued that instances of sexual contact with the accused, 
both prior to and subsequent to the alleged rape, should be considered as an influencing 
factor in the jury’s decision making process. But it is acknowledged by Kelly et al in the 
Home Office report that while such a gateway should be inserted, it should at least have a 
time limit.344 There is however, no guideline for a time limit provided. It could be that they 
assume the courts would seek to follow the R v A345time suggestion of 24hours. If this were 
the case perhaps the gateway would be little more than the inclusion of this ratio into the 
legislation. It could be suggested therefore that this does not need a gateway of its own but 
rather that it is simply a case of clarifying the current stance after R v A, which this chapter 
will go on to discuss. Birch would be very much in favour of such an addition to the 
legislation because she does not see why evidence of this kind, “if it is of some 
relevance...should...have to jump through hoops to ensure it is heard.”346And so, 
unsurprisingly, she also rejects Temkin’s suggestion to have a specific formulation through 
                                                
341 Originally Professor Birch described the legislation in this way; Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual 
History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531 at p 532, however Temkin refutes this in her 
article ‘Sexual history – beware the backlash: evaluating s.41’ [2003] Crim LR 217 342 [2001] UKHL 25 343 Temkin, Jennifer, ‘Sexual history – beware the backlash: evaluating s.41’ [2003] Crim LR 217 at p 
240 344 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at p 76 345 Op. cit 1 346 Birch, Di, ‘Untangling sexual history evidence: a rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ [2003] Crim LR 370 
at p 376 - 377 
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which existing or recent relationships can be advanced. This is because, in accordance with 
the current structure of s.41, “the defence would also have to demonstrate that exclusion 
would be an unsafe option.”347 Birch therefore, remains “unconvinced” by the “limiting [of] the 
defence in this way.”348 
 
5.2.2.2 It seems to me that relevant evidence of sexual history with the defendant, if it truly is 
relevant, can already be included under the Act. In her feminist judgment McGlynn  deals 
with this issue and rejects, as flawed, the “common sense” assumption that a woman who 
has engaged in sexual activity with a particular man is-simply by virtue of the fact-more likely 
to do so at another time with that same man.349 She draws strength for this argument from 
Canadian legislation which precludes admission of sexual history evidence solely to support 
inference that the complainant was more likely to have consented on the occasion in 
question.350  I would certainly agree with these arguments and as a result would not support 
the idea of introducing a new category specifically drafted to automatically allow evidence of 
sexual history evidence with the defendant. The evidence that Birch describes as “crucial,”351 
that is, evidence with the defendant, is only crucial if one follows the assumption that 
consent on previous occasions will result in consent indefinitely. The Act itself was 
introduced to limit the admission of sexual history and therefore such a gateway would go 
against the ethos of the legislation.  
 
5.2.3 A Gateway for Evidence of Sexual History with Third Parties 
5.2.3.1 One suggestion has been that S.41 would benefit from a gateway which 
accommodates third party evidence. This would mean evidence of the complainant’s sexual 
history with anyone other than the accused could be admitted even if it is not strikingly 
similar. Including evidence with third parties that does not fit the “strikingly similar” definition 
would create a far broader gateway than currently exists in the legislation. However, it seems 
to me that this is the exact type of evidence that S.41 sought to exclude and therefore adding 
in a gateway to admit this evidence would go against the purpose of the legislation. I would 
                                                
347 Ibid at p  377 348 Ibid 349 McGlynn’s Chapter in Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley, Feminist Judgements (Hart, 2010). 350 Section 276 of the Canadian Criminal Code 351 Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531 at p 532 
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go further than this and refuse, not only on the grounds that it would go against the grain of 
S.41 but also that such evidence bears no relevance to the alleged crime and should 
therefore not be considered. I appreciated that the defence may wish to infer that consent to 
sexual contact with the accused in the past increased the likelihood of consensual sexual 
relations in the future. However I reject the notion that consent to one man in the past could 
have any bearing on consent to a completely different man in the future. Birch, though in 
favour of a less restrictive approach to sexual history evidence noted that “evidence of this 
kind, while of marginal relevance in most cases, can too easily be put to improper use, to 
upset the complainant and to create a smokescreen to divert the jury from the real issues in 
the case.”352 There is in fact, little, if any support for such a gateway. 
 
5.2.3.2 Therefore, having rejected both the idea of getting rid of s.41 and the idea that further 
gateways should be created, this thesis will seek out a middle ground. These two options 
have been disregarded due to their extreme nature. Whilst s.41 has its problems, the 
principle it is based upon is one which this thesis supports because it involves the restriction 
on sexual history evidence. Therefore, it does have value. Such value would be lost, were 
the restrictions to be decreased, for example, through the addition of further gateways. The 
other options available include clarification and enforcement as well as training – these are 
all ideas which will be supported in this chapter. As previously mentioned this thesis 
supports enforcing the existing procedures. Supporters of clarifying the current legislative 
stance can still vary hugely in their opinions because of the controversial nature of R v A. 
Clarification could involve an incorporation of the ratio into the legislation or go so far as to 
reiterate the original wording of the legislation and therefore effectively repeal the House of 
Lord’s judgment. Whilst this thesis would tend towards lessening the effects of the case and 
therefore lean toward the tightening up of the existing legislation in its more restrictive 
nature, it ultimately strives for clarity and therefore if that would mean incorporating R v A’s 
judgment into s.41 somehow, the main aim would be that this should be done in a 
transparent fashion with its parameters being very clearly defined. However, even if R v A 
was incorporated procedure would still require far stronger enforcement than currently exists.  
 
                                                
352 Birch, Di, ‘Untangling sexual history evidence: a rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ [2003] Crim LR 370 
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5.3 Clarifying the Current Stance 
5.3.1 Clarification of the current stance is one of the most obvious solutions available in 
legislative reform. The intricacies are obviously more difficult in terms of which parts of the 
legislation actually get reworded and tightened up but the general idea of it is good and this 
thesis firmly supports the clarification of the current legislation. This process should be two 
fold; both clarifying what the existing wording means, for example where there have been 
difficulties interpreting the meanings in the past but also clarifying what changes the case 
law has had on the legislation and how far this will transcend into future cases.  
 
5.3.2 Many academics agree that clarification is essential after the decision in R v 
A353because of the controversial decision made. Temkin states that it is “likely to engender a 
degree of uncertainty.”354 Ellison also touches upon how critical the reaction toward the 
decision has been because it “undermin[es] the purpose of the legislation by effectively 
restoring to trial judges the very discretion that the YJCEA aimed to check.”355 Therein lies 
the problem; this case essentially read down s.41. Many judges have said that this made it 
“work[able]”356whilst “many public lawyers, on the other hand, have been highly critical of the 
interpretative method adopted by the House of Lords, suggesting that the approach 
amounted to ‘judicial overkill’.”357She puts feminist “dismay” at the legislation down to the 
“lack of clear, well-founded reasoning within the judgment on the issue of the relevance of 
sexual history evidence to consent.”358 Clarification of the stance therefore, would be 
extremely helpful and would show parliaments true intentions behind the Act.  
 
5.3.3 Kelly, Temkin and Griffiths go one step further than other academics and present 
practical examples of the ways in which s.41 could be clarified. For example, one of their 
recommendations is that the terms “sexual behaviour” and “sexual experience” be clarified 
                                                
353 [2001] UKHL 25 354 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at p 240 355 Easton, Susan, ‘The Use of Sexual History Evidence in Rape Trials’ in Childs, Mary & Ellison, 
Louise, ‘Feminist Perspectives on Evidence’ (Cavendish Publishing, London 2000) at  p 208 356 Kibble, Neil, ‘Judicial Discretion and the admissibility of prior sexual history evidence under section 
41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: sometimes sticking to your guns means 
shooting yourself in the foot: Part 2.’ [2005] Crim LR 263 357 Op. Cit 355 358 Ibid 
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and also be shown to include implied, as well as express, behaviour.359 This is in accordance 
with the legislation in New South Wales.360 This would certainly help however it seems that 
there are further clarifications that could be made to the wording of the section. In the Home 
Office report they also suggest that consideration be given to “amending and curtailing 
section 42(1)(b) (the belief in consent exception) to reflect both the Sexual Offences Act 
2003 and the fact that it is not generally reasonable to formulate a belief in consent on the 
basis of past history.”361 I would agree that this suggestion is valuable however it sits 
uncomfortably with the suggestion that a new gateway be made to include sexual history 
evidence with the defendant. In the same vein however, they also want a clear statement to 
be made about the exceptional nature of the admittance of sexual history evidence. Such a 
statement would be helpful as it would offer reiteration to the judiciary in particular the aims 
behind the Act. 
 
5.3.4 Whilst I think clarification of the current stance, as well as an emphasis on the 
extreme and exceptional nature of the admittance of sexual history evidence is very 
important, it seems that there is little standing in the way of further judicial interpretation and 
continued neglect of the procedural requirements. However, clarification is not a simple 
matter. There are several questions which must be presented before parliament in order for 
the clarification to be well understood. Firstly, what opinion is taken of R v A and therefore 
will it be incorporated into the section? Secondly, whether or not any additional gateways will 
be included – in which case it is less about clarification and more about a full change in 
legislation.  
 
5.3.5 As this chapter has already suggested, this thesis would not wish to support the idea 
of R v A being supplanted into s.41 because as well as going specifically against the 
section’s primary purpose of restricting sexual history evidence, it is also the submission of 
this thesis that the case was wrongly decided. In coming to this conclusion, I have been 
strongly convinced by the feminist judgment of McGlynn, which argued that whilst the 
evidence in question was not actually relevant to an issue of consent, even if it had been 
                                                
359 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at p 76 360 S. 409B(3) Crimes Act 1990 New South Wales 361 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at  p 76 
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relevant then the only possible option open to the Lords would have been to issue a 
declaration of incompatibility because the Act specifically precludes judicial discretion. 
Therefore it could not realistically be read in a compatible way without discarding the Act’s 
ultimate purpose.362 Essentially what this means is that R v A could not be read into s.41 in 
its current form without being incredibly contradictory.  
 
5.4 Enforcing the Current Rules 
5.4.1 Strong enforcement should go hand in hand with the clarification of the current 
stance. This is the main idea for reform that this thesis supports. It seems that enforcing the 
rules, both in terms of the legislative rules themselves and the Crown Court rules, should be 
done regardless; but in this case perhaps active enforcement is needed. There is disregard 
for the rules at all stages; from the way that the defence will seek to include evidence that is 
definitely excluded by S.41 right, down to the way that the Crown Court rules on procedure 
are ignored. For example, applications to include sexual history evidence are to be submitted 
in writing, in advance of the trial and yet it would seem that the most common time and place 
the evidence is first raised is in the court room itself. Temkin is in favour of tightening the 
current rules as she says “strong procedural provisions are an important accompaniment to 
laws which seek to control sexual history evidence.”363 Perhaps if the provisions are 
reiterated it will lessen their “[vulnerability] to judicial override.”364 
 
5.4.2 The Home Office report makes three procedural recommendations. Firstly that the 
Crown Court rules be observed.365 For example that there be an absolute requirement for all 
applications be made in writing and pre-trial. The only exception being that counsel were 
unaware of the information before the trial. These too should, however be made in writing 
and the prosecution be given time to consider the application, adjourning if necessary. As 
well as this judges would be required to submit their reasoning for allowing or disallowing to 
both the defence and prosecution. This would be extremely useful as it would force the 
                                                
362 McGlynn’s Chapter in Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley, Feminist Judgements (Hart, 2010). 363 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at  p 230 364 McGlynn, Clare ‘Feminist Activism and Rape Law Reform in England and Wales: A Sisyphean 
Struggle?’ in McGlynn & Munro, ‘Rethinking Rape Law’(Routledge – Cavendish, 2010) p 205 365 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at  p 77 
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judges to use the law to justify their actions thus preventing them from simply using their own 
judgement as to what they consider relevant and fair.  
 
5.4.3 They make a second recommendation that the complainant have the right to be 
present when the application for the admittance of evidence is made so that they know what 
to expect at the ensuing trial.366 If one of the aims behind limiting sexual history evidence is 
that more women report rape then this may also be a valuable suggestion.  
 
5.4.4 A final recommendation would be that the prosecution would have the right to appeal 
a decision made to permit sexual behaviour evidence.367 This may give women a greater 
sense of control throughout the decision making process. 
 
5.4.5 The first recommendation is merely an enforcement of rules which should already be 
followed, however it is still a valid suggestion. The second two are valuable additions 
because they would appear to make the trial more bearable for the complainant. The right to 
appeal a decision would of course only work if the procedure of writing in advance of the trial 
was followed therefore allowing enough time to appeal a decision. It would perhaps be a 
good idea to research how the release of the evidence in advance would affect a 
complainant’s decision to go to trial.  
 
5.4.6 In addition to these procedural recommendations the Home Office also recommends 
further research in to the trial process and training of the judiciary368 which this thesis also 
supports. The aim of such training would be to ensure that judges and lawyers understand 
the explanatory notes and Crown Court rules to prevent ignorance and misuse. Training will 
extend across all levels of the criminal justice system, notably to the police. It may be that 
public knowledge of this increased level of care would encourage women to report rape to 
the police and increase their potential to see the case through to trial. This thesis will 
especially support the concept of further training for judges so that we might begin to tackle 
some of the long standing prejudices of women’s sexual history, that the evidence might not 
be perceived in such a negative way.  
                                                
366 Ibid 367 Ibid 368 Ibid 
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5.4.7 Research that Kibble has conducted has emphasised the importance of judicial 
training. He commented “the significance of judicial training was powerfully underlined when 
one of the judges acknowledged during the interview (speaking of the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence in relation to the alternative scenario in scenario three, which virtually all 
judges said would not be admissible), ‘Left to myself I would let it all in, but I know I can’t do 
that anymore.’”369 This quote demonstrates two key issues. Firstly that s.41 is at least having 
some effect on the way the judiciary handle the evidence so that even when judges may 
want to bring in evidence that they feel is relevant, they may now exclude it on the grounds 
that it is inadmissible under the Act. The second point however, illustrates that while the 
legislation may be having some effect of the practices of the judges, it is not changing their 
mindset which is still to believe that the evidence is relevant. Kibble highlights this so called 
“bending the law”370 by picking out a quote from one judge who states that he, or she, would 
“be prepared to bend one or two things, on timing whether it’s contemporaneous, if it’s a few 
days rather than 24 hours and that sort of thing” on the grounds that it’s “a question of 
fairness” and “you do what you think is right.”371 But this judge has highlighted the exact 
behaviour that s.41 tries to stamp out. The legislation limits judicial discretion to a number of 
gateways and yet still judges are trying to make the decisions as to admissibility based on 
their own judgement of what is relevant and fair to the complainant and the defendant. Whilst 
there has been an improvement on the situation under s.2 it is by no means ideal because it 
seems that judges do not necessarily believe in the law which they are enforcing. Kibble 
believes that all judges see the benefit of training in this area, however he does elaborate on 
the personal benefit which he thinks judges receive from such training.372 It cannot, overnight 
at least, change their mindset, but perhaps for now it will at least aid the enforcement of the 
legislation.  
 
                                                
369 Kibble, Neil, ‘Judicial perspectives on the operation on s.41 and the relevance and admissibility of 
prior sexual history evidence: four scenarios: Part 1.’ [2005] Crim LR 190 at p 205 370 Ibid at p 264 371 Ibid 372 Kelly, Temkin & Griffiths, Home Office report ‘Section 41: an evaluation of new legislation limiting 
sexual history evidence in rape trial’ (2006) London at p 205 
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5.5 Is Change Necessary?  
5.5.1 There have been suggestions that we could simply leave the state of the law on 
sexual history evidence as it currently stands because R v A has made it “workable.”373 As 
one of his three options for reform Kibble suggests maintaining the current stance “now that 
R v A (No 2) has reintroduced a measure of judicial discretion.”374 He certainly believes that 
making the situation any more rigid than it already is would be to the detriment of the 
legislation. He references the comments of one judge who shares his opinion saying “it 
would be a terrible mistake for parliament to lay down rules which we must inflexibly apply” 
but seems to imply that such a stance would be to a large extent ignored by subsequently 
saying such a stance would “[fill] the court of appeal even further.”375 This brings us back, 
once again, to the problem of enforcement. It should not be the case that if the legislation is 
reformed to a stance that the judiciary do not fully support, that, by default, it is not followed 
in the correct manner. If simply pleasing the judiciary is the aim behind reform then leaving 
the law in its current state would be highly effective as it would allow the judges a free reign. 
Since however, this is definitely not the aim behind the legislation, the option of leaving the 
situation, as it is, cannot be supported here. 
 
5.5.2 Whilst Kibble supports the view that R v A has improved the situation, it does not 
therefore automatically follow that we should just leave the law as it currently stands. After 
all, even if the current law could be considered successful, there is still a chance that reform 
could improve it further. One of the judges in Kibble’s study argued that without the judgment 
in this case “we would have a straitjacket which at times would render unfairness”376 and yet, 
even if this thesis was to conclude that the decision in R v A had been a positive one, which 
it won’t, it would still recommend reform of the legislation for the reason of clarity. I think that 
the legislation should clarify the stance after R v A so that the judges can be sure of exactly 
how far the ratio goes.  
 
                                                
373 Ibid at p 264 374 Ibid at p 274 375 Ibid at p 264 376 Ibid at p 265 
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5.5.3 Birch takes a similar view in this respect and argues that whilst the case may have 
“solved some of the problems,” a better solution would be to “rethink the legislation.”377 
Whilst this thesis will not support the decision in R v A I am still of the opinion that this view 
is a more sensible approach than that of leaving the situation as it is for as Birch is arguing, 
even if the situation has been improved, this does not imply that it is perfect. She points out 
that “the decision in A(2)  also generates uncertainty as to how far it will be necessary in the 
future to stray from a natural construction in order to secure a fair trial; an uncertainty which 
is compounded by the absence of any real agreement in the House of the compulsion to do 
so on the facts of the case before them.”378 Therefore, legislative intervention would ease 
this situation. However an obvious problem occurs concerning the fact that Parliament had 
and rejected the chance of putting judicial discretion into the Act. Perhaps the reason there 
has been no further legislative intervention is because there is an awareness that the 
judiciary will only accept it as written if it allows them some discretion.  
 
5.5.4 This thesis takes the stance that far from clarifying the situation, this case has made 
the state of the law even more confusing; as well as introducing a whole new range of 
issues. Without some form of legislative direction or intervention this area of law will continue 
to suffer a fundamental lack of clarity. There has been much opposition to the proposition of 
leaving the situation as it stands, most probably because this case completely undermines 
S.41. Firstly, by putting judicial discretion back into sexual history evidence; something which 
the section deliberately sought to exclude. Secondly because of its lack of clarity. Therefore I 
see no way that the situation can simply be left to stagnate. R v A should be overturned and 
the current procedures and crown court rules should be strongly enforced.  
 
5.6 Are These Solutions Adequate? 
5.6.1 The idea supported here is for further clarification of legislation, strong affirmation of 
the crown court rules plus an explicit declaration that sexual history evidence is to be 
accepted only in exceptional cases. As the introduction of this chapter discussed, it is not 
                                                
377 Birch, D, ‘Untangling Sexual History Evidence: a Rejoinder to Professor Temkin’ [2003] Crim LR 
370 at  p 381 
378 Birch, Di, ‘Rethinking Sexual History: Proposals for fairer Trials’ (2002) Crim LR 531at p 
533 
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only legislative action that is needed, but rather, a shift in perceptions and societal views. 
However, this kind of shift could take decades if not more, so whilst judicial attitudes in 
particular may obstruct notions of legislative reform, this is not a reason to ignore the 
situation. Kibble’s study of judicial attitudes did suggest that S.41 is forcing judges to think 
much harder about what types of sexual history evidence should be allowed in and this is a 
very positive step. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
5.7.1 Ideally, sexual history evidence should rarely cause a problem in courts because 
there should not be stigma or stereotype attached to women who engage in regular sexual 
activity. The evidence should be viewed for what it is worth and should have no prejudicial 
effect to the case. However, it seems unlikely that such a reality can co-exist with current 
societal opinions and constructs. However, despite this bleak outlook this is no justification to 
avoid at least attempting to improve the situation. The options that this chapter has 
deliberately ruled out are the two extreme options of taking no action at all, in other words - 
leaving the law in the post R v A state; and the alternative extreme of creating more 
gateways. Therefore it favours an intermediate solution involving clarification of the current 
stance, enforcement of the procedural rules and continued restriction on sexual history 
evidence. If an application for the introduction of sexual history evidence is not made 
following the correct procedure then it will automatically be rejected. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 Having mapped the progress of the legislative stance on sexual history evidence 
from the lead up to the implementation of S.2, to the present day, the thesis has commented 
and analysed the successes and failures of the various positions. Having set this context it 
then looked at the pressing issue of reform. The idea behind each stage of reform over the 
last forty years has been to restrict sexual history evidence, with the view to improve the trial 
process for the victim and to, in turn increase the conviction rate whilst maintaining the 
defendant’s right to fair trial. As set out in the introduction of this thesis, there are many 
reasons why sexual history evidence should be restricted. For example, the idea that women 
are reluctant to report rape knowing that their sexual past could be brought into court. By 
restricting the amount of sexual history evidence which is allowed into the court room we 
may in turn encourage more women to report rape and therefore potentially increase the 
conviction rate.   
 
6.2 Despite the emphasis being on legislative reform, as mentioned in previous chapters, 
there are other problems with the current situation such as perceptions of rape, in 
particularly those surrounding consent and specifically how these perceptions affect the 
judiciary and juries. When certain irrelevant pieces of sexual history evidence are brought in 
to court it is arguably purely to prejudice the jury against the complainant. In turn this will 
unfortunately perpetuate rape myths. What is clear is that this problem cannot be easily fixed 
and therefore as rewarding as it would seem, this thesis has not suggested a full legislative 
rewrite. To do so would not be wise given the last two attempts. Problematically, as earlier 
referenced, the judges may follow the law but many as yet do not necessarily believe in it.379 
This tells us that a societal shift in opinion is needed before change truly takes place. 
However, the previous chapter assesses the recommendations from various proponents and 
in doing so recommends several key focuses going forward. These are, a clarification of the 
current stance; more rigorous enforcement of the procedural rules; and above all a continued 
restriction on sexual history evidence. This solution has been recommended after 
consideration of several, perhaps more extreme, options including taking no action at all and 
                                                
379 Judges stated that they felt obliged to exclude certain evidence, not because they felt it was 
irrelevant but simply because S.41 insisted upon it. Kibble, Neil ‘Judicial perspectives on the operation 
of s.41 and the relevance and admissibility of prior sexual history evidence: four scenarios: Part 1’ 
(2005) Crim LR 190 at p 194 
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adding further gateways to S.41 because it remains true to the ethos of the legislation whilst 
attempting to move forward.  
 
 
6.3 This research has maintained throughout that the decision in R v A380 has made the 
legislative stance unclear and created further problems. It seems clear now that reform is 
needed if only to clarify how this case and S.41 are to interact, as at present they seem to 
act as opposites. The main ideas that the thesis looked at were the creation of additional 
gateways so that the judges would not seek to stretch the current gateways further. Given 
that this research is in favour of tighter restrictions this was never likely to be the solution 
favoured. The ideas favoured are clarification and enforcement of the current rules. As the 
empirical studies demonstrated, the legislation is not always being followed properly. In 
some cases this may be because the judiciary are a little unclear on what is now considered 
to be ‘irrelevant’ evidence but if there is clarification then there will be no excuse for 
breaching the existing requirements.  
 
6.4 The other main idea supported here, as well as clarification and proper enforcement 
would be an additional declaration within s.41, of a declaration, similar to the Canadian 
provision that states sexual history evidence is to be brought in only in exceptional cases. 
This would enforce the mindset that such evidence is to be limited and only allowed in, in a 
small number of cases. Neither of these options are as extreme as a full scale legislative 
change or the other extreme of leaving the situation as it is post R v A.381 However, the 
benefit of these approaches is that it makes the legislations intent more plain than before – 
particularly in the form of the declaration. It makes two points; firstly that the admission of 
sexual history evidence will only be accepted in exceptional cases and secondly it will 
enforce more rigorous procedural rules. For example; any application that is not made in 
advance and in writing, should not be considered save for very exceptional circumstances. 
By enforcing the procedures set out in the crown court rules, as intended, we can truly start 
to assess if S.41 in its original form will have any success.  
  
                                                
380 R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25 
381 Ibid 
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Appendix 1 
Section 2 Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1976 
 
2. Restrictions on evidence at trials for rape etc. 
(1)If at a trial any person is for the time being charged with a rape offence to which he pleads 
not guilty, then, except with the leave of the judge, no evidence and no question in cross-
examination shall be adduced or asked at the trial, by or on behalf of any defendant at the 
trial, about any sexual experience of a complainant with a person other than that defendant. 
(2)The judge shall not give leave in pursuance of the preceding subsection for any evidence 
or question except on an application made to him in the absence of the jury by or on behalf 
of a defendant; and on such an application the judge shall give leave if and only if he is 
satisfied that it would be unfair to that defendant to refuse to allow the evidence to be 
adduced or the question to be asked. 
(3)In subsection (1) of this section " complainant" means a woman upon whom, in a charge 
for a rape offence to which the trial in question relates, it is alleged that rape was committed, 
attempted or proposed. 
(4)Nothing in this section authorises evidence to be adduced or a question to be asked 
which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Section 41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
CHAPTER III PROTECTION OF COMPLAINANTS IN PROCEEDINGS FOR SEXUAL OFFENCES 
41Restriction on evidence or questions about complainant’s sexual history 
(1)If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the 
court— 
(a)no evidence may be adduced, and 
(b)no question may be asked in cross-examination, 
by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the complainant. 
(2)The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or question only on an application 
made by or on behalf of an accused, and may not give such leave unless it is satisfied— 
(a)that subsection (3) or (5) applies, and 
(b)that a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or 
(as the case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case. 
(3)This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case 
and either— 
(a)that issue is not an issue of consent; or 
(b)it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have taken place at or about the same time as the 
event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused; or 
(c)it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the 
evidence or question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar— 
(i)to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence adduced or to be 
adduced by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event which is the subject 
matter of the charge against the accused, or 
(ii)to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such evidence) took 
place at or about the same time as that event, 
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
(4)For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence or question shall be regarded as relating 
to a relevant issue in the case if it appears to the court to be reasonable to assume that the 
purpose (or main purpose) for which it would be adduced or asked is to establish or elicit 
material for impugning the credibility of the complainant as a witness. 
(5)This subsection applies if the evidence or question— 
(a)relates to any evidence adduced by the prosecution about any sexual behaviour of the 
complainant; and 
(b)in the opinion of the court, would go no further than is necessary to enable the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution to be rebutted or explained by or on behalf of the accused. 
(6)For the purposes of subsections (3) and (5) the evidence or question must relate to a 
specific instance (or specific instances) of alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the 
complainant (and accordingly nothing in those subsections is capable of applying in relation 
to the evidence or question to the extent that it does not so relate). 
(7)Where this section applies in relation to a trial by virtue of the fact that one or more of a 
number of persons charged in the proceedings is or are charged with a sexual offence— 
(a)it shall cease to apply in relation to the trial if the prosecutor decides not to proceed with 
the case against that person or those persons in respect of that charge; but 
(b)it shall not cease to do so in the event of that person or those persons pleading guilty to, 
or being convicted of, that charge. 
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(8)Nothing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or any question to be 
asked which cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section. 
42Interpretation and application of section 41 
(1)In section 41— 
(a)“relevant issue in the case” means any issue falling to be proved by the prosecution or 
defence in the trial of the accused; 
(b)“issue of consent” means any issue whether the complainant in fact consented to the 
conduct constituting the offence with which the accused is charged (and accordingly does 
not include any issue as to the belief of the accused that the complainant so consented); 
(c)“sexual behaviour” means any sexual behaviour or other sexual experience, whether or 
not involving any accused or other person, but excluding (except in section 41(3)(c)(i) and 
(5)(a)) anything alleged to have taken place as part of the event which is the subject matter 
of the charge against the accused; and 
(d)subject to any order made under subsection (2), “sexual offence” shall be construed in 
accordance with section 62. 
(2)The Secretary of State may by order make such provision as he considers appropriate for 
adding or removing, for the purposes of section 41, any offence to or from the offences 
which are sexual offences for the purposes of this Act by virtue of section 62. 
(3)Section 41 applies in relation to the following proceedings as it applies to a trial, namely— 
(a)proceedings before a magistrates' court inquiring into an offence as examining justices, 
(b)the hearing of an application under paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 6 to the [1991 c. 
53.] Criminal Justice Act 1991 (application to dismiss charge following notice of transfer of 
case to Crown Court), 
(c)the hearing of an application under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 3 to the [1998 c. 
37.] Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (application to dismiss charge by person sent for trial 
under section 51 of that Act), 
(d)any hearing held, between conviction and sentencing, for the purpose of determining 
matters relevant to the court’s decision as to how the accused is to be dealt with, and 
(e)the hearing of an appeal, 
and references (in section 41 or this section) to a person charged with an offence 
accordingly include a person convicted of an offence. 
43Procedure on applications under section 41 
(1)An application for leave shall be heard in private and in the absence of the complainant. 
• In this section “leave” means leave under section 41. 
(2)Where such an application has been determined, the court must state in open court (but 
in the absence of the jury, if there is one)— 
(a)its reasons for giving, or refusing, leave, and 
(b)if it gives leave, the extent to which evidence may be adduced or questions asked in 
pursuance of the leave, 
and, if it is a magistrates' court, must cause those matters to be entered in the register of its 
proceedings. 
(3)Rules of court may make provision— 
(a)requiring applications for leave to specify, in relation to each item of evidence or question 
to which they relate, particulars of the grounds on which it is asserted that leave should be 
given by virtue of subsection (3) or (5) of section 41; 
(b)enabling the court to request a party to the proceedings to provide the court with 
information which it considers would assist it in determining an application for leave; 
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(c)for the manner in which confidential or sensitive information is to be treated in connection 
with such an application, and in particular as to its being disclosed to, or withheld from, 
parties to the proceedings 
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